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Abstract
In this dissertation, I oer three independent studies that each contribute to the liter-
ature on mortgage debt payments. In the rst paper, I examine the recent phenomenon
of mortgage curtailment (borrowers making voluntary partial prepayments) and link this
behavior to consumer deleveraging trends. In the second paper, I use the curtailment mea-
sures developed in the rst essay to examine heterogeneity in sensitivity to current mortgage
leverage in default decisions. Considering the group of borrowers who have previously cur-
tailed mortgage debt, I posit such borrowers should be less sensitive to current leverage than
borrowers without past curtailments because previous curtailers have revealed a lower value
on the embedded option to default on their loan because to do so would forfeit the full
amount of past partial prepayments. Indeed, I show that for borrowers estimated to have
negative equity positions, borrowers with past curtailments have approximately 30-50% less
sensitivity to current leverage than borrowers who have never made extra payments.
Finally, in the third essay I examine the role of income stability in mortgage default
decisions. I study default decisions in a sample of borrowers (governmental employees from
Clark County NV, FY20092010) whose current employment and income is known with cer-
tainty and future prospects for continued employment are above average. I nd that while
the group with known employment has a lower default rate than the remainder of home-
owners (whose employment status is unknown), but both groups have the same sensitivity
to mortgage leverage. Both the second and third studies provide evidence of strategic de-
fault behavior in the residential mortgage market and suggest that when faced with a wave
of mortgage defaults, investors and policymakers cannot provide solutions targeted towards
ability to pay without addressing declines in asset values.
vii
Chapter 1. Introduction
In 2015 the average American is certainly more aware of the potential perils present in
the housing market than he was ten years ago. Although today there is a consensus that the
worst of the mortgage market crisis has passed, few households emerged entirely unscathed
by the experience. As aggregate house prices continue to stabilize and reestablish a pattern
of steady growth, it remains an open question if the problems of the crisis have been solved or
merely survived. More specically, what can be done by lenders and policymakers to improve
assessment of default risk in individual mortgages? The essays in this dissertation aim to
exploit underutilized information about individual borrowers to improve understanding of
mortgage payment patterns and outcomes.
1.1 Evolution of mortgage lending in the US
A basic familiarity with the history of the American mortgage is essential to understanding
what challenges exist in evaluating mortgage risk post-origination. Modern mortgage lend-
ing has arisen primarily as a reaction to past crises and regulatory actions. Prior to the
Great Depression mortgages the typical mortgage would be virtually unrecognizable today.
In the early US mortgage market, loans almost exclusively had a oating interest rate, were
relatively short term (between 5 to 10 years), were typically non-amortizing (payments cov-
ered only the interest), and had high down payment requirements often only allowing the
borrower to nance half of the purchase price. Additionally, mortgages were primarily issued
by insurance companies or savings and loans associations as opposed to commercial banks
or mortgage brokers (Green and Watcher, 2005). When a crisis hit, borrowers were faced
not only with the problems of reduced collateral value and reduced ability to make mortgage
payments, but also the additional problem of lenders frequently refusing to renew the loans,
1
which led to loss of the property if the borrower was unable to come up with a large lump
sum to repay the remainder of the balance due on the property. While much has been made
about the role of teaser rates1 in the recent crisis (Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund, 2009), the
potential non-renewal of the typical early 20th century loan put the borrower entirely at the
lenders' mercy.
As a response to the widespread foreclosures during the Great Depression, the federal gov-
ernment undertook several reforms and initiatives aimed at promoting long term growth and
stability in the residential mortgage market. In 1932, the lending landscape was completely
overhauled as savings and loan associations (S&Ls) were provided liquidity to make mortgage
loans, while simultaneously being restricted to lending within a 50-mile radius. This forced
localization of a large portion of mortgage lending incentivized relationship lending and care-
ful screening of potential mortgagors by the S&Ls. This basic framework stayed in place
for decades and residential mortgage lending remained largely local until the widespread
nancial deregulation that occurred in the late 1980s that changed the rules governing the
S&Ls.
Also, as a result of the Great Depression, various institutions were formed to help provide
stability and liquidity to the mortgage market. The rst of the these, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), provided a mechanism in which a borrower paid insurance enables
FHA to guarantee mortgage payments to the lender, which served the purpose of easing the
fears and loosening the purse strings of otherwise reluctant lenders. Similarly, the Federal
National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae)2 was begun a few years later to help
develop a secondary market for mortgages (von Homan, 2000).
As guarantees made by such entities, both implicit and explicit, became more valuable
to lenders and investors, the groundwork began to be laid for the securitization of residential
1A teaser rate is a below market interest rate charged to a borrower for a short period of time (typically
1-2 years) after which is interest rate resets according to a predetermined method or rate for the remainder
of the life of the loan.
2Other important institutions that emerged later the served similar, but distinct purposes include Freddie
Mac and Ginnie Mae.
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mortgages. From the rst simple pass-through mortgage backed security (MBS) issued by
Ginnie Mae in 1970 3 to the complex MBS that emerged in the late 20th and early 21st
century, securitization provided a vehicle for participation in the market by investors as well
as an additional channel for lenders to move mortgages of their balance sheets, freeing up
capital for other purposes.
While securitization, both among players like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as well as
private label securities issued directly by lenders, grew rapidly, another technology helped
to change the landscape of mortgage lending the automated underwriting system (AUS).
An AUS is a computer program in which an applicant inputs information about herself and
the program makes a decision to grant the loan or refer the loan to additional screening.
The automation of a large portion of the lending process cut down on the time spent and
expense incurred in making a loan. A study Fannie Mae in the early 2000s showed that the
use of an AUS cut the cost of making a loan by $916 (von Homan, 2000).
Both securitization and the rising of automated lending have had profound impacts in
the residential mortgage marketplace; for the purposes of this dissertation I draw attention
to how the changes in the lending landscape created distance between the mortgagor and the
ultimate mortgagee. The rise in volume and scale of mortgage backed securities and market-
wide reliance on automated underwriting lead to loss of some individual information, such
as soft information that lenders of yesteryear were able to develop on individual borrowers
through relationship lending over time and product categories. While this information may
not be as important when times are good, much as the short term balloon mortgages worked
ne until the Great Depression hit, dierences in individual borrowers that can emerge
after loan origination can be essential in predicting and developing appropriate responses to
adverse market conditions.
3A pass-through security simply entails varies investors, each owning claim to a fractional share of the
cash ows generated by a pool of mortgages, receiving a payment proportional to their ownership interests
each month, less fees collected by the securitizer.
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1.2 Information problems in mortgage lending
Residential mortgages are by far the largest component of outstanding household debt in the
United States. Additionally, mortgage debt is the single largest component of non-nancial
sector debt, dwarng even corporate debt (see Figure 1.1). However, from the perspective of
the lender (or the ultimate investor), mortgage contracts have some important distinctions
from other forms of debt. Most pertinent to my analysis is the fact that although mortgages
are long term debt4, information on the borrower's nancial position may only be collected



















2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Credit Market Debt Outstanding
Domestic Nonfinancial Sectors
Home mortgage Consumer credit Corporate debt Total
Figure 1.1: Credit Market Debt Outstanding: Domestic Nonnancial Sectors
Data from Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z1, 2014. Figures for 2014 are through 3Q. Amounts are presented in billions of
dollars. Total debt plotted on right axis, all other categories presented on left.
As time passes, borrower characteristics known at origination become less predictive of
future payments as borrowers may change or lose jobs, take on or repay debt outside of
4Most mortgage debt has a 30 year term, although approximately 15% has a shorter term, the majority
of which are 15 year mortgages.
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the original mortgage, or otherwise experience changes in their creditworthiness. This is
contrast to other forms of debt, such as corporate bonds where investors have access to
updated nancial statements quarterly and are able to observe new debt or equity issued by
the rm.
Additionally, many theoretically important measures of borrower nancial distress mea-
sured at the aggregate level (e.g. county level unemployment or average changes in per-
capita income) have low informational content in predicting individual mortgage defaults.
Although much of this evolution in household balance sheets is unobservable, at least di-
rectly, to investors, progress to resolving this information problem can be valuable to market
participants, even if the loan will likely not be renegotiated as the result of such an update.
1.3 Household Financial Decisions
Since homeownership rates have historical been high in the US, housing assets have long
been an important component of household balance sheets. However, as household savings
rates have declined, housing wealth has become relatively more important. According to the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, household personal savings rates as a percentage of disposable
personal income (which excludes money paid towards housing expenses) declined from over
9 percent in the early 1990s to about 2 percent in late 2005. Accounting for ination, in
real terms, the average saving rate was negative during the height of the real estate bubble.
However, the repayment of a mortgage plays an important part in wealth acquisition for
many households, given stable or rising housing values. Building equity in a home can be
thought of as a regular enforceable savings mechanism for households with a mortgage.
Given the high levels of leverage in many mortgages originated in the mid-2000s combined
with lower personal savings rates, it follows for the average homeowner that housing became
an increasingly large and risky portion of personal wealth. Given that even before the run up
in housing values, housing accounted for approximately 70% of personal wealth (Amromin,
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Huang, and Sialm, 2007), increasing the lack of diversication placed many households in
a precarious nancial position. Therefore, a household with highly levered home and a low
personal savings rates (or few assets outside of housing) was susceptible to even small changes
in the value of the collateral for their loan, their house.
In fact, zipcodes with the largest share of subprime loans closely correlate with the
zipcodes with the smallest relative income growth in the early 2000s, when mortgage credit
availability greatly expanded (Mian and Su, 2009). Indeed, most of the growth in wealth
during this period, especially for the subprime households was concentrated in rising house
prices, which oset stagnant or even declining wages.
In the midst of the crisis, the role of mortgage in household portfolio and spending
decisions has become more evident; highly levered households had larger declines in spending
than other homeowners, despite having smaller changes in their net worth. This suggests
that mortgage leverage drove consumption during the house price run-up and weighed it
down more heavily during the decline above levels that would have predicted by changes
in wealth alone (Dynan, 2012). The declines in household spending and consumption were
closely linked to households that had relatively high marginal propensities to consume out of
housing wealth, namely households in zipcodes that had higher concentrations of poor and
highly levered households (Mian, Rao, and Su, 2013).
Clearly, since the wealth of the median homeowner is concentrated in his home, changes
in the housing market can have a larger impact on net worth. To the extent that such
changes can drive ability and desire for other forms of consumer spending, a better under-
standing of how individuals make mortgage payment decisions is useful. Although some
of this heterogeneity across borrowers is captured by geography (e.g. average characteris-
tics at the zipcode or Census tract level), utilizing more individual level information can




In the remainder of this dissertation, I present three essays that explore dierent facets of
borrower payment decisions in the US residential mortgage market.
The second chapter is entitled Deleveraging and Mortgage Curtailment. Using monthly
loan-level data, I observe individual curtailment payments from January 2001 to June 2011
for mortgages in twenty metropolitan statistical areas. Contrary to some earlier assertions,
American homeowners now frequently commit funds towards their mortgage payments in
excess of the amount due; over 30% of loans outstanding have made at least one curtailment
payment. After controlling for borrower and loan-level variables, I show that the latent
propensity to curtail has steadily risen from 2003 to 2006 and remains at elevated levels.
Therefore, curtailment provides an example of consumer deleveraging behavior that began
prior to the Great Recession.
The third chapter is entitled Curtailment and Strategic Mortgage Default. In this essay,
I consider borrowers, who have a strategic default (put) option on their mortgage that rises
in value with mortgage leverage. When mortgagors choose to curtail their loans by making
voluntary payments in excess of the amount due, mortgage leverage decreases and their
incentives to default strategically diminish. I examine the sensitivity of default to mortgage
leverage. I show that when households who curtail (good borrowers) default (go bad), such
defaults are only half as sensitive to current mortgage leverage as compared to borrowers
who do not curtail.
When house prices decline and mortgage leverage increases, default can occur for liquidity
reasons as well as for strategic ones when the borrower exercises his put option. My ndings
show that in such environments, payment histories are useful in identifying borrowers who
are less likely to strategically default. By doing so, it contributes to a better understanding
of default decisions during the recent mortgage crisis.
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The fourth chapter is entitled Income Stability and Mortgage Default. Debate exists on
the relative importance of employment status and house price declines in accounting for
the large number of mortgage defaults during the Great Recession. To avoid the complexi-
ties posed by potential interactions among house prices, employment status, and income, I
propose the natural experiment of examining the default decisions of homeowners with job
security and income stability.
Specically, I observe governmental workers employed in Clark County Nevada in FY2009-
2010, during the Great Recession, and compare the sensitivity of their default decisions to
changes in house values to the general population. Relative to the overall population, those
homeowners with known income stability exhibit a somewhat lower rate of default than the
general public, but both groups are equally sensitive to price in their default decisions.
The ndings of these three studies are summarized in Chapter 5. Additionally, in this
chapter I suggest directions for future research.
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Chapter 2. Deleveraging andMortgage Cur-
tailment
2.1 Introduction
Consumer debt levels fell during the Great Recession. Various reasons have been posited for
this change, including increased lending standards and a reduction in the demand for debt.
During the crisis, households responded to adverse economic conditions by increasing savings.
One of the ways that households engaged in savings behaviors was through the reduction
of outstanding consumer debt, including paying down mortgage debt (Charkrabarti et al.
2011).
Advantages of examining changes in existing mortgage loans include: (1) Unlike new debt,
existing debt is not directly aected by changing lending standards1; (2) Aggregation bias is
avoided because detailed observations are available on individual behavior; (3) Deleveraging
due to charge-os or foreclosures can be separated from deleveraging due to acceleration of
debt repayments. Mortgage curtailment (voluntary partial prepayment) is a setting in which
consumer deleveraging choices for individuals can be observed.
I cannot observe borrowers non-mortgage consumer debts. However, mortgage debt rep-
resents 70% of all household liabilities (Justiniano et al. 2013). Often mortgage debt is less
expensive than other forms of debt such as credit card debt or personal loans; in this case
rational deleveraging should appear in those higher cost debts prior to reduction of mortgage
debt. If mortgage debt is relatively expensive, it would be dicult for borrowers to replace
large amounts of mortgage debt with other forms of consumer debt. Nonetheless, not hav-
ing information on individual borrowers' non-mortgage debts represents a possible omitted
variable issue.
1Although there is no direct eect, individuals could still modify their future borrowing behavior due to
changes in opportunities.
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The institutional setting of mortgage payments provides a relatively controlled setting to
examine borrowers' leverage choices and motivations for reducing debt. Initially, it must be
determined if borrowers are rate sensitive in their deleveraging decisions. If so, curtailment
is primarily an investment strategy wherein individuals choose to minimize (maximize) their
leverage when rates are high (low) by making excess (only minimum scheduled) principal
payments. If individuals are not rate sensitive, this suggests that other factors may drive
curtailment behavior. In general, household attitudes towards debt (and by extension, the
desire to reduce household debt levels) are also related to non-pecuniary social psychological
factors in consumer debt and savings behaviors (Lunt and Livingstone 1991, Lea et al. 1993,
1995, Brown et al. 2005).
Much of the deleveraging literature examines household behavior in response to the Great
Recession, which is associated with subsequently lower levels of leverage (Bricker et al. 2011).
In fact, aggregate consumer debt did not begin to decline until mid-2008 (Brown et al. 2011).
In contrast to these results, we nd that the latent propensity to engage in curtailment
payments (after controlling for many economic factors) began to increase as early as 2003
during a time period (2002-2007) where, in aggregate, consumers demanded higher levels of
debt (Weller 2007). This is important because it shows that within the controlled setting of
curtailment, household deleveraging (all else equal) began prior to the Great Recession.
Curtailment payments are applied directly to the mortgage principal balance. A bor-
rower who elects to make a partial prepayment reduces his outstanding debt, the life of the
mortgage, and future interest costs. Making a curtailment payment is a voluntary action on
the part of the borrower and may be done at any point in time2 and in any amount less than
the total balance outstanding.3
2Theoretically, curtailments can even be made even when the mortgage is delinquent, but in this case any
excess payment will rst be applied to past balance due and late fees before being considered a curtailment.
3Many mortgages have a prepayment penalty in eect for the rst 12-60 months of the life of the loan that
prevents a borrower from repaying greater than 20% of the mortgage outstanding in excess of the regular
payment schedule in a single year without facing a substantial penalty.
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Mortgage curtailment has historically been a relatively rare choice for American home-
owners, but I observe a dramatic increase in the popularity of this behavior in recent years
(see Figure 2.1). In January 2004, only 0.23% of borrowers in my sample made a curtailment
payment of at least $100 that month; the same time in 2005 1.41% chose curtailment. In


















Raw Curtailment Rate Latent Propensity
Figure 2.1: Curtailment Rates
The curtailment rate is calculated using data from private securitized mortgage market. This graph uses the $100 minimum
value of curtailment. The left axis graphs the monthly raw curtailment rate, the right axis illustrates the yearly propensity to
curtail as compared to the base case of 2011.
Additionally, the monthly curtailment rate remains high through June 2011, the end of
our sample period. Note that there is a dramatic jump between 4Q 2005 and 1Q 2006, but
after accounting for borrower and loan-level variables the latent propensity to engage in cur-
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tailment behavior begins three years earlier and shows a much smoother rise. Curtailment
behavior continues to increase in popularity through the end of our sample period, June 2011.
The goal of this chapter is to better understand the motivations for mortgage curtailment
behavior, and by extension household deleveraging behavior, among US homeowners. After
allowing for variation in loan, borrower, locational, vintage, and servicer characteristics, I
show that the choice to make additional payments has become more attractive to borrowers
in recent years. This documents the increasing importance of mortgage curtailment in the
US mortgage market.
Mortgage curtailment is often omitted from mortgage pricing and payment models, but
I suggest that this event reveals additional information about and insights into borrower
behavior. I show that as the spread between current mortgage interest rate and the short
term risk-free rate increases, the probability of making a curtailment payment increases,
particularly for borrowers estimated to have positive equity in the property at the time of
observation.
A certain subset of homeowners who have (unobservable) discretionary income available
and do not currently value the default option on their mortgage4 may be motivated to commit
those funds to accelerate paying down their relatively high interest rate mortgage as return
on safe investments, such as savings accounts, becomes less unattractive. After accounting
for variation in a host of borrower and loan characteristics, the pattern of curtailment from
2001-2011 is smoothed, and shows a secular increase over the sample period (See Figure 2.1).5
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 briey outlines previous
curtailment literature, discusses borrower behavior, and presents the choice to curtail in an
options framework, Section 2.3 discusses the empirical models employed, Section 2.4 discusses
the dierent data sources used in this study, denes key variables, and provides summary
4That is, they view the timely repayment of their outstanding mortgage debt as certain, at least in the
short term.
5The latent propensity is derived from the coecients of the observation year xed eects from the main
empirical specication, presented in Section 2.5.
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statistics, Section 2.5 presents the results, and Section 2.6 summarizes as well as proposes
directions for future research.
2.2 Literature Review and Discussion
First, I summarize the previous research related to mortgage curtailment in Section 2.2.1.
Second, I discuss some interesting patterns of curtailment behavior and present several po-
tential economic and behavioral motivations for engaging in curtailment behavior in Sec-
tion 2.2.2. Finally, I discuss the choice to curtail within an options framework in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Previous Research
Mortgage curtailment has not received much attention in the real estate literature. Relative
to the extensive academic literature on prepayments in full, the literature on curtailment is
limited. Also, a large portion of research related to mortgage payment decisions is targeted
towards the importance of payment events for the pricing of mortgage backed securities.
Campbell (2006) notes that despite the importance of housing and mortgage debt for house-
holds, there is a limited amount of research on mortgage decisions from the perspective
of individual households. By exploring determinants of mortgage curtailment decisions for
individual borrowers, I contribute to the literature on personal mortgage payment choices.
The rst study to investigate mortgage curtailment is Hayre and Lauterbach (1991). They
highlight the importance of accounting for partial prepayments in calculating the weighted
average maturities (WAM) of mortgage pools in the context of securitization. Also, they
observe that failing to account for curtailment will upwardly bias the average age of the
mortgage pool.
Budinger and Fan (1995) examine curtailments in the context of pools of jumbo loans.
They nd that curtailments seldom occur early in the life of the mortgage and that curtail-
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ment rates signicantly increase in the later years of a mortgage. Budinger and Fan also
observe a trend of seasonality with curtailment at the pool level being least likely in the fall
months and increasing curtailment frequency beginning in December until reaching a peak
in April.
A borrower who makes a curtailment payment may choose to repeat this behavior sev-
eral times over the course of the life of the loan. Fu (1997) nds that records of previous
curtailment for a given mortgage greatly enhance the chance that the borrower will make
a curtailment payment in the future. Although they do not specically study curtailment,
Amromin, Huang, and Sialm (2007) document the reluctance of households to participate in
nancial markets and how paying down existing debt can be viewed as an alternate method
of personal savings.
Budinger and Fan (1995) identify three variables: the mortgage interest rate, loan size,
and loan to value (LTV) ratio, that help forecast future curtailments.6 A borrower's liquidity,
value of retiring debt, loan age, and available alternative uses of discretionary funds help
predict the likelihood of engaging in curtailment behavior (Abrahams 1997).
Additionally, some previous studies have focused largely on the impact of curtailments in
Asian markets since curtailment behavior has been linked to populations with high household
savings rates (Lin et al. 2005). In another study of curtailment behavior in Asian markets,
Ling and Yang (2005) nd individuals who curtail their mortgages exhibit dierent behaviors
than those who do not; curtailment is associated with a 85% reduction in default risk and
a 23% higher probability of future prepayment. These behaviors have implications for both
the pricing of and investment in mortgage backed securities.
In the most recent study of this behavior by American homeowners using survey data to
infer curtailment behavior, a household's propensity to save is found to be highly positively
correlated with the probability of mortgage curtailment (as measured by being ahead on
mortgage payments) and that liquidity risk also factors into the decision to make a curtail-
6The authors utilize LTV at origination, not an estimate of current leverage at the time each observed
payment.
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ment payment (Adleman, Cross, and Shrider 2010). In contrast, this is the rst study to
specically examine loan-level time-varying curtailment behavior in the American mortgage
market.
2.2.2 Curtailment Motivation and Descriptive Statistics
Curtailment is an individual expression of a borrower's desired level of mortgage leverage.
Conditional on borrowers having funds available to make a curtailment payment, the choice
to do so or not will be a reection of their preferences among available alternatives.7 A
household that engages in this behavior has the choice to spend discretionary income in any
manner they see t, but has elected to apply funds towards the principal outstanding on
their mortgage. Household investment and leverage preferences vary across time and may
be impacted by changes in variables that are closely connected to housing and mortgage
decisions such as interest rate levels and changes in housing price levels.
A borrower who desires to decrease their overall nancial leverage may have other out-
standing debts that may have higher interest rates (such as credit card debt) or shorter
amortization periods (such as automobile loans or student loans) that I do not observe in
my dataset. Rationally, a borrower may choose to prioritize to accelerate repayment of these
forms of debt instead of reducing mortgage debt, therefore the study of mortgage curtail-
ment cannot provide an exhaustive analysis of a borrower's deleveraging actions, but it can
characterize the borrower's appetite for reducing debt in for what a majority of households
is their largest nancial liability, their home mortgage.
Additionally, a curtailment payment is a rearmation of the borrower's commitment
to repay the mortgage debt. By putting more funds towards the loan than the mortgage
contract requires, the borrower who engages in mortgage curtailment reveals they place a low
7Mortgage curtailment is always the choice of a borrower, not an obligation. Since borrowers are never
obligated to curtail their mortgage, the amount of money observed to be used as a curtailment payment is
some unknown portion of a given borrower's discretionary income.
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value on the option to default. Observing curtailment behavior gives insight into borrower
choices beyond what is revealed by prepayment or default decisions, such as appetite for
leverage.
When a borrower prepays or defaults they are no longer observable, but when a borrower
makes a curtailment payment I can continue to monitor their behavior. When the curtailment
option is optimally exercised by a rational household, the full menu of mortgage options is
available in the next payment period ranging from default to prepayment, but if a borrower
prepays in full or loses the home in foreclosure, the mortgage is terminated and no mortgage
options may be exercised in the future. Curtailment payments are part of an intertemporal
household utility maximization exercise; rational borrowers engaging in this behavior must
be of the belief that curtailment payments provide the most utility for a given amount of
discretionary income at a given point in time (Chinloy 1993).
Therefore, curtailment behavior decisions hinges on both the desire and ability of the bor-
rower to make curtailment payments. For many borrowers, mortgage curtailment appears
to be a regular planned behavior. For example, I observe many borrowers who curtail in the
same amount at regular intervals (i.e. a curtailment equal to an extra month's payment once
every year or an extra $100 each month). For other borrowers, they may choose to curtail
infrequently or perhaps only once over the life of their loan, often in a large dollar amount.8
Examination of the dollar amount curtailment payments amounts reveals that for all ob-
servations with curtailment payment of at least $100, 25.69% make a curtailment payment
of exactly $100, 14.04% curtail $200, 10.69% curtail $500, and 9.34% curtail $1,000. Addi-
tionally, 36.24% (1,692,475 monthly remittance reports) of all observations with curtailment
observations are in the amount of $500 or more and 18.97% of borrowers that engage in this
behavior (890,359 monthly remittance reports) curtail $1,000 or more.9 The distribution of
all curtailment dollar amounts for all monthly observations is presented in Figure 2.2.
8A complete description of the curtailment criteria and measurement is presented in Section 2.4.2.






















































































































































Figure 2.2: Curtailments by Dollar Amount
Curtailments under $100 or greater than 90% of loan balance outstanding are counted as 0 and omitted from this graph.
Considering all loans active as of June 2011, 30.26% had at least one observation of a
curtailment at least $100 in their payment history and 11.38% had at least one record of
a curtailment of $1,000 or more. Of all borrowers making curtailments over the sample
period, about 65% made two or more curtailment payments in our observation period (see
Figure 2.3). This contrasts with the earlier ndings of Adleman, Cross, and Shrider (2010),
who observed that among borrowers in the 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004 iterations of the
Federal Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances, 22.20% of borrowers made an curtailment
payment of any amount sometime in the life their mortgage.
Note that I am only observing loans that were originated in 1998 or later and our obser-
vation period ends in mid-2011; there are very few observations of loans over 10 years old in
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my sample10 and as noted by Budinger and Fan (1995) and Abrahams (1997) higher levels
of curtailment are associated with older loans, particularly loans nearing the end of their
amortization schedule. What I am primarily observing is curtailments of loans fairly early
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Figure 2.3: Number of Curtailments Per Loan
Only loans containing at least one curtailment are graphed. 14.75% of curtailing borrowers had more than 20 curtailment
observations.
As additional evidence that curtailment is an economically signicant behavior, I compare
average curtailment amounts (using $100 as a minimum value an individual observation being
recorded as curtailment) to average principal and total payment due across all observations
in the sample. On average across the sample period for every dollar of principal due, there
are an additional 8 cents paid as curtailment and on average for every dollar of total payment
(principal plus interest) due, I observe an additional 12 cents paid as curtailment.
10The average loan of a loan in my sample is 32 months and approximately 95% of the loans within the
sample were originated post-2002.
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2.2.3 Option aspects of curtailment
Option pricing provides a canonical way to model mortgage choices (Kau and Keenan 1995,
Kau et al. 1992, 1995 and Quigley and Van Order 1995). Another way to characterize the
choice to curtail a mortgage is within an option pricing framework in which the decision
to make an extra payment is a non-terminal choice (Chinloy 1993). However, due to a
lack of popularity of curtailment as a payment option to American borrowers in the past,
previous empirical studies using US data omit the curtailment choice from the menu of
options considered by the borrower (Fei 2010).
A borrower must make a decision each period of whether to pay, not pay, prepay in full,
or to partially prepay (curtailment). In a myopic world, where P is the property price, B
is the mortgage balance, r is the current rate of interest, and c is the existing rate on the
mortgage contract, the borrower would pay in the state of the world where the price P > B
and c < r, would renance (prepay) in the state of the world where P > B and c > r, and
would not pay in the state of the world where P < B. Note, a pecuniary motivation for
curtailment does not emerge in such a myopic world. However, in the option pricing view
of mortgages where the borrower makes decisions today based on various states of the world
over the future periods, all possible states have some potential inuence on decisions made
today. For example, borrowers could decide to pay today even if P < B because of possible
states of the world such that Pt > Bt, where t is a future time period.
Are there any states of the world or situations where curtailment has pecuniary value?
Consider the situation where the borrower needs to have sucient equity to fall below the
maximum permitted loan-to-value ratio (LTVmax) to be eligible renance the mortgage.
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Now suppose the borrower does not meet the loan-to-value restriction and also pays an
above market rate (c > r and P < B/LTVmax). Furthermore, suppose the borrower does
not anticipate or intend to default, and wishes to renance. In this case, to renance the
11Daglish (2009) discusses the potentially diminished value of the default option for subprime borrowers
within a declining interest rate environment.
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borrower must reduce the balance B (assuming constant P ).
There are two ways to do undertake this strategy. The rst way would be to invest
money at prevailing short-term risk-free interest rates s until acquiring enough funds to
reduce B suciently. The second method would be to partially prepay B over time until
B has reached the desired level. This curtailment strategy could be undertaken by making
several extra payments over time, or if the borrower has sucient cash on hand, make one
large curtailment payment.12 In environments where r < c and with positive sloping yield
curves, s < r < c. In this case, curtailment will have a pecuniary advantage over investing
funds and deferred prepayment (with the important proviso that the borrower does not
anticipate or intend to default). Since curtailment has value in some states of the world, it
has a non-zero probability of occurrence. Given that the probabilities associated with the
various choices (default, current, curtailment, and prepayment) sum to one, the introduction
of the curtailment choice aects the probability of the other choices.13 To assess the factors
that inuence the curtailment choice, the curtailment option must be considered alongside
the options to default, make the contractually obligated payment, or fully prepay the loan.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
The simplest way of estimating multiple probabilities is by multinomial logistic regression
which has been employed in several other mortgage studies (Archer et al 1996, Clapp et al
2001, Clapp et al 2006).14 Multinomial logit estimates a separate equation for each identied
choice as shown in (2.1) where l is the identied choice which runs from 1 to J as shown in
(2.2), i is the ith individual observation, xit is a 1 by k vector containing the ith individual's
12Theoretically, the borrower could nance the curtailment by taking on new debt, but it unlikely that
such a strategy would be nancially optimal or even feasible.
13Moreover, curtailment in a given period could be followed by states of the world in which continuing
curtailment, reverting to regular payment, or choosing a full prepayment could be optimal. In this sense,
curtailment can be viewed in a compound options context.
14Multinomial logit was chosen over multinomial probit because of computational diculties and chosen
over a competing hazards model due to the potentially repetitive nature of the curtailment choice, unlike
the terminal choices of default or prepayment.
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explanatory variable data in the tth time period, and yit is the ith individual's choice in
the tth time period. However, the mortgage data contains information about individuals
without dierentiating information specic to each choice. Accordingly, one choice is not
identied and becomes the base case. The other estimated equations are in terms of the
dierences between the respective choice and the base case. Let γ(l) represent the dierence
between the k by 1 parameter vector associated with the lth choice β(l) and the base case
choice parameter values β(0).








γ(l) = β(l) − β(0), l = 1, · · · , J (2.2)
In this context, the base case is that the mortgage is current; the other cases are late,
curtailment, or fully prepaid.
Additionally, I employ a two-limit tobit regression model to investigate the eects of the
variables of interest on the amount of curtailment a mortgagee, i, chooses to make in a given
time period, t. I estimate a model where y∗it is the unobserved latent variable of interest, the
amount of curtailment a borrower makes of the form:
y∗it = xitβ + εit (2.3)
where xit is a vector of borrower characteristics. These borrower characteristics are largely
known and xed at origination, although some individual time varying characteristics are
included. Additionally, the vector of borrower characteristics may include xed eects for
loan vintage, location, observation year and time, and servicer that are identied at the
individual loan level.
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$0 if y∗it ≤ $0
y∗it if $0 < y
∗
it < $13, 215
$13, 215 if y∗it ≥ $13, 215
2.4 Data, Variable Denitions and Summary Statistics
I describe data sources and detail our sample section procedure in Section 2.4.1. Next,
I dene my measurements of curtailment in Section 2.4.2. I dene variables and present
hypothesis in Section 2.4.3. Last, I provide summary statistics and a correlation matrix for
key variables in Section 2.4.4.
2.4.1 Data
Loan-level data comes from Blackbox Logic, LLC (BBx).16 BBx covers over 90% of non-
agency residential securitized mortgages including prime, alt-a, and subprime loans.17 BBx
has detailed mortgage contract information at loan origination and monthly records of mort-
gage payment information. BBx contains information on 21,409,761 loans, and 708,373,906
remittance records (497,925,228 of which are for single family properties) as of June 2011.
The composition of loans in the sample changes over time. New loans enter the sample as
they are originated and securitized. Loans exit the sample when they are prepaid in full,
the loan term period is nished, or when a property is repossessed by the lender due to
15The number of left censored observations depends on the threshold for curtailment used in a given model
(e.g. $100, or $1,000)The right-censoring value, $13,215, is the 99th percentile value for positive curtailment
observations.
16Detailed BBx data information is available at http://www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm.
17Agarwal, Chang and Yavas (2012) nd evidence of adverse selection in the prime securitzed market, but
no clear evidence of adverse selection in the subprime market using similar large mortgage datasets.
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non-payment on the part of the borrower. For details of the time-varying market coverage
of the BBx database, see Table 2.1.18
Table 2.1: BBx Market Coverage 2001-2010, trillions of dollars
Year BBx Total Securitized Total Single Family Securitized Market Total Market
2001 $0.11 $3.54 $5.66 3% 2%
2002 $0.25 $3.96 $6.41 6% 4%
2003 $0.34 $7.24 $4.46 8% 5%
2004 $0.59 $4.97 $8.27 12% 7%
2005 $1.10 $5.67 $9.39 19% 12%
2006 $1.77 $6.60 $10.46 27% 17%
2007 $2.25 $7.40 $11.17 30% 20%
2008 $2.19 $7.55 $11.07 29% 20%
2009 $1.84 $7.60 $10.87 24% 17%
2010 $1.53 $3.05 $10.52 50% 15%
Securitized market includes total securitized market, public and private. BBx covers over 90% of the total
private securitized market.
Monthly home price index levels for twenty major metropolitan areas comes from the S&P
Case-Shiller Composite 20 (CS-20) index. I limit this study to the metropolitan statistical
areas represented in the CS-20 index.19 The Case-Shiller index methodology provides a list of
counties included in each of the CS-20 areas; loans in the BBx database are also identied by
county as one of the list of variables recorded about the loan at origination. Included in our
sample are loans in these geographic areas for which loan characteristics at origination and
monthly payment information is available. New observations enter our sample as additional
loans are securitized. Mortgages may be seasoned before they appear as observations in our
sample since they only enter the database at the point of securitization.20 Since the CS-
18Market coverage was calculated using the methodology from Pafenberg (2005).
19Detailed information about Case-Shiller geographic coverage and methodology is available at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-indices/en/us/?indexId=spusa-
cashpidp-us-. The CS-20 areas dier slighlt from the Metropolitans Statistical Areas (MSAs) that
contain these cities.
20For example, in 2001 there could be observations from a 30 year loan originated as early as 1971.
However, over 99% of the mortgages in this database are originated in 1998 or later. For simplicity we
exclude loans originated before 1998 from our sample.
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20 index is based on single family residential transactions (1-4 home properties), I exclude
large investment properties (such as apartment complexes). Additionally, for simplicity, we
exclude junior mortgages and interest-only loans from our sample.
The key information utilized from BBx is the series of monthly payment data for the
over 4 million loans that are located in a county that is included in a CS-20 area. From
these remittance records, excess principal payments (curtailments) can be identied on the
individual level by date and amount. Additional information utilized from BBx includes
loan origination date, securitization date, loan to value (LTV) ratio at origination, FICO
score at origination, original loan balance, payment records for each month, prepayment
penalty indicator, loan term (15 or 30 year)21, loan interest type (adjustable rate or xed
rate mortgage), loan documentation level, and loan interest rate both at origination and
observation dates.
Prevailing monthly market mortgage rates are from the Federal Reserve, 12 month Lon-
don Interbank Oered Rate (LIBOR) based on the U.S. dollar are from the British Bankers'
Association, and historical loan conforming limits by county are from Fannie Mae.
2.4.2 Identication and Measurement of Curtailment Payments
I identify curtailments at the loan level by the following criteria. First, in the base speci-
cations the curtailment payment in a given month must be at least $100 and the sum of
all curtailments must be greater than $100 for a loan to be identied as a mortgage that
exhibits curtailment behavior.22 The purpose for setting this minimum value is that in the
raw data there are many observations that had very small payments that likely resulted
from the borrower rounding the payment amount to the nearest dollar, or even forgetting
21Loans of other maturities, such as 20 year or 40 year make up less than 1% of all observations and are
excluded from this analysis.
22I also set the minimum at $10 and $1,000 and the results do not materially change. However, it is
worth noting with that with the $10 minimum, the percentage of loans exhibiting curtailment increases,
particularly in the early years of the sample to as high as 3.5% of all observations exhibiting in some months
prior to 2006.
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the exact amount due; these small amounts likely do not reect a conscious eort on the
part of the borrower to make additional principal payment and increase home equity.
Secondly, I lter the curtailment observations to ensure that the curtailment amount ob-
served does not have a negative oset later (implying the original observation had a recording
error). Additionally, I insure that the payment I observe beyond the balance due is for a
borrower who is current on mortgage payments and that it results in a corresponding reduc-
tion in total balance outstanding in the following period, ensuring that the extra payment
is not part of an unobservable late penalty. All observations a mortgage while delinquent
in payments are classied as having zero curtailment. However, these observations are still
included in our sample, and if they exhibited curtailment behavior before becoming delin-
quent, those extra payments would still be classied as curtailments and if the borrower later
becomes current, any extra payments made after the loan is reclassied as current would be
considered curtailments.
Lastly, the partial prepayment must be for less than 90% of the outstanding balance to
be considered a curtailment in the sample. The rationale for this criterion is that a large
partial prepayment of 90% or more of the balance outstanding is eectively a prepayment
in full and therefore not representative of curtailment behavior as we have dened it. This
is a reasonable restriction because the vast majority of loans in our sample are early in their
amortization schedules, therefore any partial prepayment of greater than 90% is akin to full
prepayment; indeed most loans where such a large partial prepayment is observed are paid
in full the next month.
Once these restrictions are applied, there are 20,669,757 curtailment events for single
family loans identied in the database in the time period January 2001 to June 2011. BBx
contains nearly 95 million single family remittance records that are located in a CS-20 city;
curtailment behavior is observed in approximately 4.15% of all available monthly observa-
tions across all years covered by the database. Although curtailment amounts have a wide
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range of values,23 in the main specication I treat the dependent variable, curtailment, as a
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the borrower makes a curtailment payment for a given
monthly remittance report, 0 otherwise. I use a binary variable to represent curtailment,
because I contrast curtailment with other binary payment choices the borrower may make,
being delinquent, remaining current, or full prepayment.
2.4.3 Independent Variables
Previous studies identied several borrower and loan characteristics associated with borrower
curtailment choices. In this section, I propose new variables potentially related to a bor-
rower's likelihood of curtailment. Also, I provide additional insight to previously identied
curtailment factors.
2.4.3.1 Borrower Leverage
The rst key independent variable uses an estimate of current loan to value ratio at each
monthly observation, t=m. This variable is constructed with ve key data points, the loan
to value ratio (LTV) at origination, which includes the mortgage balance at origination,
(MBt=0), and value of the home at time of origination (Vt=0), mortgage balance outstanding
at time of observation, (MBt=m), the Case-Shiller index level for a given city, i, at origination
(CSit=0), and the Case-Shiller index level for that city, i, at the time of the observation
(CSit=m).
A precise updated monthly measure of LTV is not possible, since property appraisals are
conducted infrequently, and even when they are conducted, that information is not part of
our data set.24 Since LTV is not updated continuously, this measure provides a reasonable
proxy for the changing home price environment the borrower encounters.
23Curtailment amounts are allowed to range from $10, $100 or $1,000 (depending on the specication) to
90% of current loan balance outstanding.
24As Andersson and Mayock (2014) point out, it is important to use the most accurate measure of CLTV
as possible to avoid noisy equity estimates creating biases in estimates.
26




(Vt=0 · (1 + ∆CSi))
)
(2.4)
where ∆MB equals the change in mortgage balance from t=0 to t=m and ∆CSi is the
proportional change in the Case-Shiller index for city i from t=0 to t=m.
Examining how CLTV inuences the propensity to make curtailment payments can oer
insight to the borrowers reacting to not only the change in value of their properties over
time, but the amount of equity they have in their properties. Level of borrower equity
impacts many household decisions, including ability to get home equity loans or renance
their mortgage.
For example, a borrower who originated a loan at the peak of the housing market with
a LTV of 1 (the home purchase is 100% nanced) and has been making regular payments
since origination would have had no trouble obtaining a renance loan in a growing or
stable housing price environment, all else equal. However, if that borrower's property is
in an area which has suered a substantial decline in housing value since origination, the
LTV may now exceed 1. If market rates have also declined since origination to the extent
that renance would be favorable for the borrower, without positive equity, renancing may
not be available.25 This gives the borrower that has sucient disposable income or other
relatively liquid and low-yield savings an incentive to adjust LTV through curtailment, and
this incentive is intensied the greater the future savings renance oers to that individual.
Alternatively, a borrower with very high CLTV may be underwater on their mortgage,
that is they owe more on their mortgage obligation than their home is currently worth.
Such borrowers may be at higher risk of delinquency or foreclosure and may be nancially
constrained, making them less likely to make curtailment payments.
Using the CLTV estimate, I construct an indicator variable neg_eq that takes the value
25Of course, exact renance requirements for a given loan are unobservable and may vary by lender and
time. However, at the extreme, a reasonable assumption is that having a non-negative equity position would
be a necessary condition for nance for most borrowers.
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of 1 if a given observation has a CLTV>=1, and 0 otherwise, as well as a complementary
indicator variable for positive equity, where pos_eq takes the value of 1 if a given observation
has a CLTV<1, and 0 otherwise.
Additionally, borrower leverage at origination is measured by LTV_origination. Al-
though the relationship at origination between choice of leverage and credit spreads is likely
endogenous (Titman et al 2005), I am interested in the eects of the initial choice of lever-
age on future payment decisions. For instance, we would expect high initial leverage to be
positively associated with default probabilities, but negatively associated with curtailment
or prepayment. Post-origination changes in leverage cannot aect the rate charged on the
mortgage or other mortgage features that were contracted at origination of the loan, therefore
there is no simultaneous feedback loop between current leverage and mortgage characteristics
determined at origination.
2.4.3.2 Savings Premium
The premium over the risk free rate proxy, 12 month LIBOR, is used to measure the relative
attractiveness of curtailment as an alternate investment opportunity and is expressed as:
savings_premiumit = currentrateit − libor12t (2.5)
As the premium between a mortgage's current interest rate and the prevailing short term risk-
free rate grows, investment in reducing the relatively high interest rate mortgage debt may
be an attractive alternative investment to some borrowers who view the timely repayment
of their mortgage as certain. For accelerated repayment of mortgage debt, borrowers may
choose between curtailments and full prepayment depending on household nancial situations
and preferences as well as renance eligibility and desirability.
I then consider the possibility that borrowers with current positive equity positions may
behave dierently than those that currently have negative equity positions. I interact the
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savings premium with the positive and negative equity indicator variables (pos_eq savings
premium and neg_eq savings premium) to examine the savings premium on borrowers esti-
mated to have positive and negative equity, respectively. The savings premium for negative
equity borrowers is expressed as:
neg_eq_savings_premiumit = savings_premiumit · neg_eqit (2.6)
The savings premium for positive equity borrowers is expressed as:
pos_eq_savings_premiumit = savings_premiumit · pos_eqit (2.7)
For mortgagors with sucient levels of home equity to be eligible for renance, a sizable
positive premium over LIBOR should increase the relative probability of prepayment over
curtailment. However, observed renance behavior tends to lag optimal timing for renance
by an average of a year (Stanton 1995), even in periods when excess leverage does not
constrain renance ability. I would anticipate the savings premium to be positively associated
with both prepayment and curtailment. However, those borrowers with negative equity may
be less able to take advantage of potential savings than those with positive equity. I would
expect that savings premium eects may not be signicant to other borrowers who may
be nancially constrained and have no free cash to make a curtailment payment, even as
it becomes more nancially attractive. Although this hypothesis is not directly testable, a
negative equity position is likely correlated with overall nancial constraint for the borrower.
2.4.3.3 Measurement of Credit Risk
A borrower's credit quality at origination is largely captured by his FICO score. FICO scores
provide a method of ranking potential borrowers by the probability of having a negative credit
event in the next two years, typically on a scale from 400 to 850. (Most scores are between
550 and 800.) A negative credit event can be as small as a single missed payment, or can
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be a large scale event like foreclosure. Borrowers with lower scores have a greater chance
of all types and magnitudes of negative credit events than borrowers with higher scores.
Previous studies (e.g., LaCour-Little 1999, Pennington-Cross 2003, and Ghent and Kudlyak
2011) have shown that FICO score at origination is positively associated with prepayments
and negatively associated with defaults in both the prime and subprime mortgage markets.
Since the curtailment option is more closely associated with prepayment than default, I would
anticipate high credit quality to be associated with a higher probability of curtailment, all
else equal. Similarly we would expect the relationship between co and prepayment to also
be positive.
Additionally, another dimension of borrower's riskiness is captured by the initial interest
rate premium. To construct this variable, the initial interest rate on a mortgage is compared
with the market rate for a similar type of mortgage at the time of loan origination. For
example, the interest rate on a 15 year xed rate rst lien mortgage is compared with the
prevailing 15 year xed mortgage rate for the month that mortgage was originated.
rate_premiumi = initialratei −marketratet=0 (2.8)
The initial premium attempts to capture a element of borrower risk that is not encompassed
by FICO. For example, a cash out renance mortgage typically has a higher initial interest
rate than a traditional renance. Even if the borrower has an excellent credit score, they
may still have an interest rate premium on such a loan. Additionally, the rate premium may
be negative for a borrower who has a below market teaser rate" for some initial portion
of the loan's life. I would expect higher values rate premium to increase the likelihood of
both default for borrowers with negative equity and increased likelihood of prepayment for
borrowers with positive equity, conditional on the loan not being in a period of prepayment
penalty.26
26Although the presence of a positive or negative deviation from market interest rate at origination may
not necessarily be a measure of credit risk, because the borrower may or may not have qualied for other
mortgages products, it is informative in identifying deviations from a standard contract, a choice on the part
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2.4.3.4 Adjustable and Fixed Rate Mortgages
Mortgage type is denoted with an indicator variable that equals one if a loan is an adjustable
rate mortgage (ARM), and zero if it is a xed rate mortgage (FRM). Campbell and Cocco
(2003) show that using a life-cycle model with borrowing constraints and income risk that
an ARM is generally an attractive choice relative to a xed-rate mortgage, but this relative
attractiveness is diminished for risk-averse households with characteristics such as large
mortgages and low moving probabilities.
Since ARMs typically have lower interest rates at origination than FRMs and there is a
general declining interest rate regime over our sample period, ARMs may be associated with
a higher rate of curtailment if the borrowers are nancially non-constrained and respond
to lower than anticipated monthly payments associated with declining interest rates. Addi-
tionally, making curtailment payments on ARM loans will lead to a reduction in monthly
balance due at the next interest reset period, but will not change the overall length of the
amortization schedule.27 This ability to lower future required monthly payments may make
curtailment attractive to nancially non-constrained ARM borrowers.28
2.4.3.5 Term of Loan
In addition to the payment amount and interest rate dierence between loans of dierent
lengths, the choice of a 15 or 30 year loan reveals some information about borrowers' debt
preferences.29 Borrowers who choose a 15 year loan show their preference for a shorter term
loan, which in and of itself is a form of curtailment (Adelman, Cross, and Shrider 2010).
Given this, I might expect borrowers with shorter term loans to have a higher propensity to
of the borrower.
27Of course, if interest rates risen, the monthly payment will also rise, but less than it would have if
curtailment payments had not been made.
28Additionally, ARM borrowers with teaser rates may choose to make curtailment payments near interest
rate reset dates to protect against payment shock. Although we do not explicitly test this hypothesis due to
data reporting limitations for some servicers, we acknowledge this may be a motivation for borrowers with
initial teaser rates.
29Although loans for terms other than 15 or 30 years exist in our dataset, I limit this analysis to these two
most popular loan terms.
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make curtailments than those that have 30 year loans. Alternatively, the future savings in
reduced interest payments may oer greater pecuniary benets for borrowers with 30 year
terms than borrowers with 15 year amortization schedules, which could lead to borrowers
with 30 year loans having a higher likelihood of curtailment.
2.4.3.6 Loan Size
I classify loans by size according to whether they t the Fannie Mae conforming loan limits.
For a given loan, the original balance is compared to the historic conforming limit for a
loan originated in that county for that year.30 If the original loan balance is higher than
the conforming limit, I classify that mortgage as a jumbo loan. All else equal, I would
expect large loans to have a higher probability of curtailment as has been found in previous
studies.31
2.4.3.7 Prepayment Penalty
A prepayment penalty indicates that the borrower may not repay the loan in full or prepay
more than 20% of the loan in a single year for some specied period of time after origination
without facing a substantial nancial penalty. Prepayment penalties have been shown to
increase the value of delaying mortgage prepayment in the commercial mortgage sector where
such penalties are common (Kelly and Slawson 2001). Prepayment penalties for single-family
loans largely fell out of favor in the 1980s, but by the beginning of the sample period, such
penalties began to increase in popularity again.
I construct an indicator variable for prepayment penalty that equals one if a loan has a
prepayment penalty at the time of a given remittance report, and zero if there is no prepay-
ment penalty currently present for that loan. In my sample the length of the prepayment
penalty ranges from 0 months to the full term of the loan. However, 61.89% of the loans
30https://www.fanniemae.com/content/fact_sheet/historical-loan-limits.pdf.
31Budinger and Fan (1995) and Lin and Yang (2005) both nd a positive relationship between loan size
and curtailment probability.
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contain no prepayment penalty, 5.53% have a prepayment penalty in place for one year,
11.75% for two years, 17.38% for three years, and 2.95% for ve years.32 Since borrowers
with prepayment penalties are only severely penalized from repaying their loans in full, all
else equal, it is likely that such borrowers are more likely to engage in partial prepayment,
or curtailment behavior.33 Additionally, the presence of a prepayment penalty should lower
the likelihood of a full prepayment, due to the large nancial penalties that would result
from such a decision.
2.4.3.8 Documentation Level
Another variable of interest is the level of documentation a loan is reported to have at time of
origination. I create indicator variables for low documentation loans (documentation_low)
and loans with unknown levels of documentation (documentation_unknown), which I com-
pare to the base case of a full documentation loan. I would expect low documentation loans
to have lower probability of curtailment and prepayment and higher chance of default rel-
ative to loans that are fully documented. Since I do not know the documentation level of
the unknown documentation category, I do make predictions of this status on payment out-
comes, but simply use it as a means through which I can compare loans known to have full
or low documentation.
2.4.3.9 Observation Year Fixed Eects
I use a series of indicator variables to control for the year that each remittance report is
observed. As suggested by the raw data, I would expect the coecients on these variables
would be increasing over time. However, unlike the raw data, I would expect the pattern
of curtailment to show a smoother increasing trend after accounting for all of the loan level
variable and xed eects.
32Cross-sectionally this translates into 77.19% of remittance reports having no prepayment penalty present.
33Most curtailment amount are far below the 20% repayment penalty threshold; therefore borrowers with
a prepayment penalty will not penalized for engaging in curtailment behavior.
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2.4.3.10 Servicer Fixed Eects
Mortgagors' curtailment patterns may vary signicantly depending on which institution ser-
vices the loan. Although borrowers may curtail at anytime, many borrowers may be uned-
ucated about this option unless informed about it by their servicer. Dierences in servicer
experience and competency may lead to variation in the ease of the execution of the mort-
gage curtailment option by borrowers. Additionally, servicer xed eects may capture other
elements related to borrower risk that are unobservable in the dataset.
For example, there may be a clientele eect among servicers or certain servicers may have
a high concentration of loans containing exotic features that are not visible in dataset. I use
a series of indicator variables to assign loans to one of the nineteen largest servicers34 or to
an additional category that encompasses all other smaller servicers' loans. Although I only
observe servicer information at time of securitization, I believe this eect captures signicant
heterogeneity in lending practices as well as other unobservable information about borrowers.
2.4.3.11 Other Fixed Eects
Mortgagors' curtailment patterns may also vary signicantly depending on when the loan
is originated, where the collateral property is located, and the seasonality of the payment
activity. I employ a series of indicator variables to control for xed eects related to loan
vintage, property location, and month of payment observation. The omitted category for loan
vintage is 2004, the year with the most new loans entering the sample. The omitted category
for payment month is December, and the omitted CS-20 city is Dallas. These variables are
primarily used to provide additional controls for potentially unobserved heterogeneity of
borrowers. A complete list of variables used is summarized in Table 2.2.
34As measured by percentage of loans in the BBx population serviced by a given institution.
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Table 2.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
payment status categorical variable indicating payment choice of borrower:
delinquent, current, contains curtailment, or fully prepaid
curtail 1 if the observation contains a curtailment, 0 otherwise
curtail_amt dollar amount of the curtailment
CLTV Estimated current loan to value ratio for loan
neg_eq 1 if loan has CLTV>=1, 0 otherwise
pos_eq 1 if loan has CLTV<1, 0 otherwise
savings premium current interest rate minus current 12 month LIBOR
neg(pos)_eq savings premium interaction of neg(pos)_eq and savings premium
arm 1 if adjustable rate mortgage, 0 if xed rate mortgage
term_30 1 if 30 year loan, 0 if 15 year loan
co borrower FICO score at origination
rate premium initial interest rate minus comparable market
rate at origination
jumbo 1 if original loan balance is larger than conforming loan
limits for that county at time of origination, 0 otherwise
prepay_penalty 1 if loan contains a prepayment penalty, 0 otherwise
documentation_full 1 if loan is fully documented, 0 otherwise
documentation_low 1 if low documentation loan, 0 otherwise
documentation_unknown 1 if documentation of loan unknown, otherwise
city 1 if property located in a given CS-20 city, 0 otherwise
vintage 1 if loan originated in a given year, 0 otherwise
activity year 1 if remittance report occurs in a given year, 0 otherwise
activity month 1 if remittance report occurs in a given month,0 otherwise
servicer 1 if loan is handled by a given servicer, 0 otherwise
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2.4.4 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for selected variables are presented in Table 2.3 for monthly observations
that exhibit curtailment behavior (curtail=1), those that do not (curtail=0), as well as the
whole sample.
There are several notable dierences between the characteristics of the observations that
contain curtailment payments and those that do not. Observations that have curtailment
payments are more likely to be adjustable rate mortgages. Lower interest rates, which
are associated with ARMs, translate into smaller monthly payments, relative to similar
FRM borrowers. (Borrowers who curtail adjustable rate mortgages will have the additional
benet of reducing their future required monthly payment after the interest reset date in a
declining interest rate regime.) Financially non-constrained ARM borrowers may respond
to the lower interest rate by devoting some of their interest savings to reduce their mortgage
debt outstanding.
Additionally, the average savings premium positive equity borrowers with curtailment is
higher than loans with positive equity than those without curtailment. The same is true
for the savings premium for borrowers with negative equity. However, the two groups are
similar on some other dimensions, including likelihood of having a 30 versus 15 year mortgage,
documentation levels, and number of borrowers with jumbo loans.
To address any concerns about multicollinearity, a correlation matrix for all key inde-
pendent variables is included in the Appendix. These correlations show there is no concern
about multicollinearity problems amongst these variables (the highest correlation is 0.6373,
most are below 0.2). In unreported results, the correlations between all independent variables
used were considered, including for all of the xed eects variables. Most of the correlations
are quite low, and none exceed 0.35.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
No Curtail Curtail All
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
neg_eq 0.1985 0.3989 0.2397 0.4269 0.2055 0.4041
neg_eq savings 4.0750 1.7766 4.4486 1.7578 4.1487 1.7791
premium*
pos_eq savings 2.8690 2.0230 3.2557 2.1678 2.9315 2.0521
premium*
LTV_origination 72.7808 15.2873 74.0575 14.8740 72.9965 15.2258
arm 0.5766 0.4940 0.6581 0.4743 0.5904 0.4918
term_30 0.9480 0.2221 0.9568 0.2034 0.9495 0.2190
FICO 688.4406 71.2190 673.2841 77.3188 685.8796 72.5086
risk premium −0.4797 1.7763 −0.4666 2.3045 −0.4776 1.8760
jumbo 0.1810 0.3850 0.1663 0.3724 0.1785 0.3830
prepay_penalty 0.2252 0.4177 0.2422 0.4284 0.2281 0.4196
documentation 0.4560 0.4980 0.4604 0.4984 0.4567 0.4981
low
documentation 0.1852 0.3884 0.1570 0.3638 0.1804 0.3845
unknown
*neg_eq (pos_eq) savings premium summary statistics are reported for observations where
neg_eq=1(pos_eq=0).
2.5 Results
This section presents and discusses regression results from multinominal regressions in Ta-
ble 2.4 and the results from two-limit tobit regressions in Table 2.5. For the approximately
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75 million single family monthly remittance records for properties located in CS-20 cities
for which the curtailment dummy variable is populated, approximately 65 million have non-
missing values for all variables of interest in my regression specication. Due to computa-
tional constraints, we take a 25% random sample by loan identier.35 The regression results
for this full sample are presented in Figure 2.4. Complete results, including estimates for
all xed eects, are included in the Appendix. For all regression results, standard errors
reported are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the loan identier level.
2.5.1 Multinomial Logit Results
I present the main results from the multinomial logistic estimations in Table 2.4. (The
full results, including all xed eects estimates, are presented in the Appendix.) Moreover,
Table 2.4 contains the results from two multinomial regressions. The rst multinomial re-
gression uses the denition of curtailment of $100 or more (positive curtailments of less than
$100 would be treated as current, the base case). The second multinomial regression uses the
denition of curtailment of $1,000 or more (positive curtailments of less than $1,000 would
be treated as current, the base case).
The rationale for the dierent thresholds are to see if the results are sensitive to large
changes in the denition of curtailment and to try to separate large from small curtail-
ment decisions.36 Presumably, borrowers who make large curtailment payments do so more
strategically than individuals who may make small curtailment decisions based on diverse
behavioral criteria (dislike of debt, upward rounding of the mortgage payment to the nearest
thousand, and so forth).
35This is about 875,000 loans corresponding to approximately 18.5 million remittance reports.
36I also estimated the model with a curtailment minimum of $10 and results are largely similar to the
model with $100 minimum curtailment value.
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Table 2.4: Late, Curtailment, and Prepayment Multinomial Logit Estimates
$100 Min. $1,000 Min.
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
neg_eq 0.3191 −0.4628 −1.0500 0.3326 −0.8518 −1.0342
25.7979 −20.7940 −45.8078 26.8959 −17.7728 −45.1896
neg_eq savings 0.1616 0.0561 0.2142 0.1545 0.2151 0.2054
premium 56.6626 10.5121 40.3583 54.2679 18.7095 38.7957
pos_eq savings 0.1482 0.0092 0.2920 0.1420 0.1160 0.2837
premium 66.2065 2.5457 116.2488 63.6208 16.3028 113.6475
LTV_origination 0.0161 −0.0032 −0.0013 0.0162 −0.0066 −0.0011
70.7840 −8.5220 −9.0222 71.5308 −9.5794 −7.4893
arm 0.3371 0.1462 0.4314 0.3313 0.5083 0.4241
53.8720 11.5977 82.9419 52.9618 20.9231 82.2001
term_30 0.1316 −0.2210 0.0482 0.1401 −0.6307 0.0572
7.0075 −9.0427 4.5294 7.4574 −14.9945 5.4384
co −0.0084 0.0041 0.0004 −0.0085 0.0066 0.0003
−197.3644 45.8155 11.5260 −200.2674 37.0783 8.0266
risk premium −0.0019 0.2544 0.0873 −0.0182 0.2598 0.0683
−1.1037 92.9931 51.6478 −10.8541 51.9495 41.1729
jumbo −0.2965 0.2594 0.0451 −0.2972 1.0552 0.0469
−36.5108 21.1403 8.4374 −36.7160 51.8114 8.9040
prepay_penalty 0.0547 0.0974 −0.6072 0.0475 0.2513 −0.6181
10.2906 9.6178 −124.9288 8.9510 12.6060 −127.6516
documentation_low 0.1444 −0.0805 −0.1885 0.1479 −0.0444 −0.1839
24.9183 −7.2871 −36.6477 25.5470 −2.1628 −36.2699
documentation_unknown −0.4143 −0.2432 1.2965 −0.4058 −0.2196 1.3090
−49.1349 −14.1921 215.2107 −47.9764 −6.2290 219.0656
constant 2.0710 −6.2123 −5.4977 2.1077 −10.1327 −5.4522
47.6154 −71.4391 −147.6197 48.4804 −58.7720 −147.2812
N observations 18,476,303 18,476,303
N curtailment 1,323,825 257,298
N loans 815,827 815,827
Pseudo-R2 0.1511 0.1651
This table presents the multinomial logistic results for the minimum curtailment amounts of $100 and $1,000 with the competing
choices of delinquency, current payment, curtailment, or full prepayment. The base case for both regressions is current payment
status. Coecients reported with t-statistics below. Standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on
the loan identier level.
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The regression incorporates several variables that theoretically should aect the proba-
bility of curtailment as well as many control variables. The main pecuniary consideration
modeled involves the potential desire to curtail mortgages that charge a higher rate than
the rate on savings, as specied by LIBOR. However, individuals with negative equity may
wish to preserve their option to default and so may not wish to curtail even if rates are
favorable. To model the eects of savings and the dierent incentives faced by those with
positive and negative equity, I allow for a linear trend in the predicted log-odds by including
both negative equity (neg_eq) and negative equity interacted with the dierence between
the current mortgage rate and LIBOR (neg_eq savings premium).
I repeated this exercise with positive equity which led to the variable pos_eq savings
premium (but allowed the positive equity to be part of the intercept since the neg_eq and
pos_eq indicator variables summed together would equal a constant). Although for both
curtailment multinomial regressions, the savings premium for negative equity borrowers has
a larger magnitude than the savings premium for positive equity borrowers (0.215 versus
0.116 for the larger curtailment payment), when allowing for the large negative eect for the
negative equity indicator variable (−0.852) the relative predicted log-odds of curtailment for
those with negative equity is lower (provided the dierence between the current mortgage
rate and LIBOR is under 8.6%). Therefore, borrowers with positive equity who pay a higher
rate for their mortgage compared to LIBOR have increased relative odds of curtailment.
As another pecuniary variable, most prepayment penalties allow some principal reduc-
tion before imposing the penalty, and therefore curtailment oers a way to decrease the
penalty. The results show that, as anticipated, prepayment penalties increase the relative
log-odds of late payments and curtailment (0.048, 0.251), but decrease the relative log-odds
of prepayment (−0.618).
In terms of other important mortgage-specic control variables, an increase in the LTV
ratio at origination increases the relative log-odds of late payments and decreases relative
odds of curtailment and prepayment for both curtailment thresholds. In contrast, ARM
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status raises the relative log-odds of late payments, curtailment, and prepayment relative
to the base case. Borrowers with 30 year mortgages have higher relative log-odds of being
late or prepayment, but lower relative odds of curtailment. Borrowers with higher FICO
scores have lower relative log-odds of being late, and higher relative log-odds of curtailing or
prepaying relative to the base case.
Borrowers with a higher initial spread have a lower relative log-odds of being late (al-
though in the $100 curtailment case this is not statistically dierent from the base case) and
higher relative log-odds of curtailment and prepayment. Borrowers with jumbo loans have
lower relative odds of being late and higher relative odds of curtailment and prepayment.
Low documentation status increases the relative odds of late payments, but decreases relative
odds of curtailment and prepayment. In contrast, unknown documentation status has higher
relative odds of late payments and curtailment, but lower relative odds of prepayment. Note,
even though curtailment represents partial prepayment the log-odds coecient for prepay-
ment and the log-odds coecient for curtailment do not always share the same signs. Overall,
these results are consistent with the hypotheses presented in Section 2.4.3.1 2.4.3.8.
2.5.2 Full Sample Fixed Eects
To control for various sources of heterogeneity, I include geography, vintage and servicer xed
eects. I control for location xed eects by using indicators for city of property location.
The variation at the servicer level is controlled with indicators for the 19 largest primary
loan servicers, plus an additional category that encompasses all the smaller servicers. I also
account for unobservable dierences in lending standards across time by including indicator
variables for year of loan origination. All loans originated in 1998, 1999, or 2000 are included
in the Vintage 2000 or earlier variable and all loans originated in 2007 or later are included in
the Vintage 2007 group.37Results for xed eects estimates for are included in the Appendix.
37Both of these groups include less than 1% of the total sample each, and results do not substantially change
if pre-2000 or post-2007 observations are instead excluded. A small portion of the database containing loans
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Date of loan payment observation is controlled for in two groups of variables, month xed
eects (discussed in Section 2.5.2.1) and year xed eects (discussed in Section 2.5.2.2). The
base case for each of these four groups of xed eects is as follows: for servicer xed eect
the base case is the largest primary servicer, Countrywide Home Loans, for location eects
the base case is Dallas, for vintage eects the base case is 2004, for activity year eects the
base case is 2011, and for month eects the base case is December.
With regard to the servicer indicator variables, relative to Countrywide (the excluded
category), almost all of the servicers have signicant negative relative odds of prepayment
and signicantly positive relative odds of curtailment. LaSalle has positive relative odds of
both curtailment and prepayment. Litton and PHH have curtailment relative odds that are
not statistically signicant for the larger curtailment denition.
For the vintage indicator variables, all of the vintages after 2000 (with the exception of
2005) show positive relative log-odds of curtailment for the larger curtailment amount as
compared to 2004, the year with the greatest number of new originations. For prepayment,
it shows signicantly positive relative odds ratios from 2000-3 vintages, but signicantly
negative relative log-odds ratios from 2005-7.
With regard to the city indicator variables, Boston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San
Diego, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. all have higher relative log-odds of curtailment
and prepayment for both denitions of curtailment whereas Charlotte, Phoenix, and Portland
show lower relative log-odds of curtailment and higher relative log-odds of prepayment for
both denitions of curtailment, relative to the base case city of Dallas. The coecients on the
larger curtailment amounts for Atlanta, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Las Vegas, Minneapolis,
Seattle, and Tampa are not statistically signicant. Again, the interest for these variables
is in capturing heterogeneity in individual loans rather than testing absolute and relative
magnitudes of these eects.
originated before 1998 are completely excluded from the sample.
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2.5.2.1 Seasonal Eects
The seasonal eects of curtailment are shown in Figure 2.4. These estimates oer some
interesting insights to borrower behavior and suggest some possible motivations for the timing
of curtailment.38 As shown in the graph, the probability of curtailment is most likely in
December, but also reaches a local maximum in April. Curtailment probabilities show a
generally increasing trend from June to the end of the year. Since curtailment is a use of
discretionary income and is a form of savings, it makes sense that the likelihood of curtailment
is associated with times of the year where borrowers have more available discretionary income
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Figure 2.4: Parameter Estimates for Seasonal Eects
Base case is December
38Budinger and Fan (1995) present similar results for the seasonality of curtailment in more general terms.
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The higher probability of curtailment in December may be associated availability and
use of end of the year bonuses, an irregular source of income that nancially non-constrained
borrowers may choose to devote to accelerated debt repayment. Additionally, end of year
curtailment rates may be related to holiday employment. The spike in April may be as-
sociated with tax refunds, another source of irregular income that borrowers may devote
to mortgage curtailment. Although there is signicant seasonal variation in the timing of
curtailment choices, partial prepayments are observed throughout the year.
2.5.2.2 Observation Year Eects
The yearly indicator variables capture the eects of time after controlling for many individual
level characteristics, geography, loan vintage, servicers, and seasonality of payments. The
yearly indicator variables show a pattern of statistically signicant, negative relative log-odds
of curtailment that become more positive over time for both denitions of curtailment. For
example, for the $1,000 curtailment amounts the estimated coecient for 2002 and before is
−21.59 and this rises to −0.078 in 2010. The patterns of relative log-odds for late payments
and prepayment do not show such a consistent pattern.
Compared to the dramatic jump in curtailment presented in the raw curtailment data in
Figure 2.1, the graph of the parameter estimates for observation year eects also included in
Figure 2.1 presents a much smoother pattern of the popularity of curtailment over the sample
period. After controlling for borrower and loan variables as well as city, vintage, and seasonal
xed eects, there is no longer a sharp jump curtailment rates in 2006. The probability of
curtailment shows a constant pattern of growth of curtailment behavior beginning in 2002.
2.5.3 Curtailment Amount
I use the two-limit tobit specication described in Equation 2.3 to estimate the eects of
borrower characteristics on the amount a borrower chooses to curtail. The results from the
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full sample as well as splits on loan type and loan term are presented in Table 2.5.39 In each
of the tobit estimations presented I set the minimum curtailment amount to be $1,000. The
signs of each of the variables agrees with the multinomial estimates; the amount of curtail-
ment is positively associated with savings premiums, FICO scores, adjustable rate loans, the
rate premium, prepayment penalty, and jumbo loans and is negatively associated with neg-
ative equity, original leverage, and low or unknown loan documentation levels. When $100
is instead used as the minimum value for curtailment, the estimates remain largely simi-
lar with the exception of the two savings premium variables, which become insignicant.40
This supports the notion that large curtailers have more of a savings motivation relative to
borrowers who make small curtailment payments.
Within the tobit setting I examine the eects of dierent term (15 year versus 30 year)
and type (FRM versus ARM) on the amount a borrower chooses to curtail. For the loan
term comparison we create interaction variables between indicator variables for 15 and 30
year loans and each of the key variables and then estimate a single model containing all of
the interaction terms as well as all of the xed eects. The coecient estimates for each of
the key variables for both 15 and 30 year loans are reported in the second and third column
of Table 2.5. I then test if the estimates of each variable is dierent for the two loan terms
and report if the estimates are signicantly dierent in the subsequent column. Borrowers
with 15 year loans have signicantly dierent coecients from borrowers with 30 year loans
for savings premium (among borrowers with positive equity), leverage at origination, FICO
scores, initial rate premiums, and prepayment penalties.
39All geographic, vintage, observation year, observation month, and servicer xed eects used in the
multinomial model were included in estimation, but the output is omitted.
40Results from $100 minimum curtailment value are omitted from Table 2.5, but available upon request.
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Table 2.5: Tobit Global and Subsample Estimates
Variables Global 15 yr 30 yr ∆ FRM ARM ∆
neg_eq −1, 984.4910 −1, 388.6090 −1, 956.0300 −1, 597.3940 −1, 982.1330
−18.1122 −0.7336 −17.8272 −7.0537 −16.1800
neg_eq savings premium 533.2325 −35.8444 525.1784 103.3266 568.1202 ***
20.2472 −0.0839 20.0762 1.7566 19.7579
pos_eq savings premium 323.6201 47.2302 328.7429 *** 63.5712 355.0056 ***
17.9115 0.7517 17.7707 2.0106 17.2053
LTV_origination −19.2147 8.0738 −22.5075 *** −1.4079 −30.8042 ***
−11.3685 1.7941 −12.7523 −0.5904 −14.1948
arm 1, 247.1800 2, 059.6880 1,293.5821 . .
21.6219 2.9432 22.2382 . .
term_30 −1, 674.4240 . . −1, 884.5811 −2, 225.5248 **
−16.4637 . . −17.7934 −5.3229
co 15.7525 16.6913 15.6538 * 13.3307 17.0335 ***
35.5233 26.2136 35.1927 22.6992 34.9980
rate premium 630.9389 260.3274 632.4170 ** 295.7174 622.8852 ***
48.6696 2.1148 48.5500 5.5112 46.7163
46
Table 2.5 continued
Variables Global 15 yr 30 yr ∆ FRM ARM ∆
prepay_penalty 515.5441 −308.1352 593.8134 ** −216.2385 784.3930 ***
10.9988 −0.9385 12.4095 −1.8775 15.0902
jumbo 2, 846.7000 3, 106.5090 2, 796.6070 2, 869.0190 2, 788.8460 ***
48.8610 16.0987 46.9568 33.8649 39.7518
documentation_low −135.6321 −449.6538 −90.5241 −318.6525 −21.0109
−2.7549 −2.4024 −1.7799 −4.1676 −0.3288
documentation_unknown −778.6440 −1, 210.7930 −501.4495 −304.1952 −573.9149 **
−9.8610 −2.9203 −6.2316 −1.9020 −6.5361
Left-censored observations 16,284,395
Right-censored observations 11,448
Pseudo-R2 0.0545 0.0554 0.0558
Coecients reported with t-statistics below. *,**,*** indicate subsamples signicantly dierent at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels, respectively. Vintage,
observation year, observation month, servicer, and city xed eects included but not reported. Standard errors reported are robust to heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the loan level.
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Additionally, several variables that are predictive of 30 year loan curtailment amount are
insignicant among 15 year borrowers. Although in the global model 30 year loans were
associated with smaller curtailment amounts, as mentioned in Section 2.4.3.5, 15 year loans
may tend to have more behavioral reasons for curtailment while 30 year loans may have more
pecuniary motives, given the greater interest expenses associated with longer term loans.
I then follow the same procedure for testing the dierential eects of xed and adjust-
ment rate mortgage on the amount curtailed. In this specication the sample is more evenly
split with 59% of the sample containing observations for adjustable rate loans. In this spec-
ication all of the coecients for the key variables are signicantly dierent between FRMs
and ARMs, except for the negative equity indicator and the indicator for low documentation
loans. Also, some of the variables that are highly predictive of ARM curtailment amounts are
not signicant for FRM loans (neg_eq savings premium, LTV_origination, prepay_penalty,
and documentation_unknown). However, the remaining variables are still signicantly pre-
dictive of the amount of curtailment chosen by xed rate borrowers, suggesting that factors
such as higher creditworthiness, larger loans, and positive equity positions are the primary
considerations of higher curtailment amount for FRM loans.
In general, the results from the multinomial and tobit models are consistent; the same
variables that are predictive of the curtailment choice are also predictive of the amount a
borrower chooses to curtail.
2.6 Conclusions and Future Research
Historically, curtailment has been a prominent borrower behavior in Asian markets, but
largely absent from or considered to be of little signicance in the US mortgage market.
However, the rate of curtailment for US borrowers experienced tremendous growth in the
past decade. In fact, curtailment is a fairly common behavior that I observe in 6% or more
of all mortgages each month from 2006 onwards. Additionally, 30% of all mortgages in my
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sample have at least one remittance report containing a curtailment payment.
I develop a model to identify borrower and loan specic variables that are associated
with a higher probability of making a curtailment payment. I show that curtailment is
more likely for borrowers with higher credit scores, shorter loan terms, lower leverage at
origination, and current positive equity, all characteristics associated with lower default risk.
Borrowers with a prepayment penalty have an increased probability of curtailment (and
lower probability of prepayment in full), illustrating that curtailment can be an attractive
choice for borrowers desiring to reduce debt outstanding, but facing substantial nancial
penalties for full prepayment of their loan. Additionally, I provide support to the savings
hypothesis of curtailment by presenting evidence that borrowers accelerate repayment of
relatively expensive debt.
Most importantly, after controlling for borrower and loan-level variables, as well as xed
eects for geography, year of origination, servicers, and seasonality, I show that the propensity
to curtail has increased over the sample period. Interestingly, the increase in curtailment
behavior predates the deleveraging trend observed in aggregate consumer debt. I show
that mortgage curtailment is both common enough and has enough economic signicance to
warrant additional attention, which may lead to new insights.
For example, the question of do borrowers who curtail (low current value of default option)
but subsequently default provide a control group of non-strategic defaulters is examined in
Chapter 3. Additionally, could curtailment act as a barometer of local housing market
fundamentals? Does curtailment predict prepayment motivation (moving versus interest
rate savings)?
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Chapter 3. Mortgage Curtailment and Strate-
gic Default
3.1 Introduction
Mortgage default may be motivated by the inability of a borrower to continue making pay-
ments, perhaps due to an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, such as job loss or unexpected medical
expenses. Alternatively, mortgage default may also be a reaction to a decline in housing prices
that renders the mortgage balance outstanding greater than the property's current value.
Liquidity defaults can occur at any time, but the option to strategically default, or for the
borrower to exercise the put option on their loan, only becomes valuable in an environment
where there are large housing price declines. As home-equity shortfalls increase, borrowers
have been shown to increase their willingness to strategically default (Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales, 2013; Bhutta, Dokko, and Shan, 2010). However, in such a world, both motivations
for default exist and it becomes dicult to dierentiate between the two.
The diculty in distinguishing between liquidity and strategic default arises in part
because much of the information known about individual borrowers is only collected at
the time of origination. Both lenders and policymakers face a substantial informational
problem in developing solutions to assist borrowers in an environment where negative equity
is prevalent because it is dicult to determine which homeowners would benet most from
a measure of relief to prevent foreclosure (Foote, Geraldi, and Willen, 2008).
There is ample recent evidence that consumers behave strategically in nancial decision
making. For example, borrowers have changed their relative prioritization, or the pecking
order, of repayment of credit card and mortgage debt from 2001 to 2009 (Andersson et al.,
2013). Furthermore, the announcement of any modication program may exacerbate po-
tential strategic behavior, such as the 10% relative increase in delinquency rates following
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the announcement of the 2008 Countrywide legal settlement, which agreed to oer modica-
tions to severely delinquent mortgagors (Mayer et al., 2014). Therefore, the ability to better
predict strategic default behavior is important in developing better responses to observed
delinquencies and defaults.
To help circumvent the problem stemming from lack of dynamically updated borrower
information, I use monthly payment histories to glean additional insights about loans after
origination. Specically, I identify a group of borrowers engage in mortgage curtailment, or
the act of voluntarily making payment in excess of amount the contractually due. These
curtailments reveal additional post-origination information about the borrower, namely that
the borrower has funds available in excess of the amount due and makes the choice to put
some portion of such (unobservable) discretionary income towards the repayment of their
mortgage.
In the US market, curtailment has historically been treated as a rare event of little
economic consequence, but in recent years it has been shown to be an important household
savings mechanism (Adelman, Cross, and Shrider, 2010). Additionally, curtailment is now
a common behavior, approximately 35% of rst lien mortgages outstanding as of 2012 have
made at least one curtailment payment. Curtailment began to increase in popularity as early
as 2003; indeed, curtailment is an example of consumer deleveraging behavior that began
prior to the Great Recession, as shown in Chapter 2. Additionally, because the borrower
has the choice each remittance cycle of whether he wishes to make a partial prepayment or
not; curtailment provides dynamically updated information about a borrower's repayment
preferences and abilities.
From the perspective of the borrower, curtailing mortgage debt and subsequently de-
faulting on the loan likely results in a total loss of the excess payments, thus such defaults
would be inconsistent with the concept of strategic default. I exploit this mortgage curtail-
ment behavior to show that curtailing borrowers display only approximately half as much
sensitivity to current mortgage leverage in their default decisions relative to non-curtailing
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borrowers. This result is robust to both the frequency and dollar amount of past curtail-
ments. Additionally, the result is consistent for subsamples of dierent types of loans, the
inclusion of additional demographic and geographic information, as well as a propensity
score matched sample. The dierence in leverage sensitivity provides support to the concept
of using mortgage curtailment to identify loans that are less likely to strategically default.
Thus, I contribute to a better understanding of default decisions during the recent mortgage
crisis.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 discusses previous
studies that relate to curtailment, mortgage options, and strategic default, Section 3.3 and
gives an overview of the data, variables and summary statistics, Section 3.4 presents the
empirical models and results, Section 3.5 presents various robustness tests, and Section 4.6
concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Section 3.2.1 provides an overview of the existing literature on mortgage curtailment. Sec-
tion 3.2.2 provides discussion on some previous studies on strategic mortgage default. Sec-
tion 3.2.3 briey discusses option pricing in the context of mortgage payment decisions.
3.2.1 Mortgage Curtailment
Mortgage curtailment has not received much attention in the real estate literature. Campbell
(2006) notes that despite the importance of housing and mortgage debt for households, there
is a limited amount of research on mortgage decisions from the perspective of individual
households. By using curtailment history to help explain loan-level default, I contribute to
the literature on personal mortgage payment choices in the context of household nance.
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The rst study to investigate mortgage curtailment, Hayre and Lauterbach (1991) high-
lights the importance of accounting for partial prepayments in calculating the weighted av-
erage maturities (WAM) of mortgage pools; failing to account for curtailment will upwardly
bias the average age of the mortgage pool. Budinger and Fan (1995) examine curtailments
in the context of pools of jumbo loans. They nd that curtailments seldom occur early in
the life of the mortgage and that curtailment rates signicantly increase in the later years
of a mortgage and three variables (mortgage interest rate, loan size, and loan to value ratio)
help predict future curtailments. Additionally, a borrower's liquidity, value of retiring debt,
loan age, and available alternative uses of discretionary funds help predict the likelihood of
engaging in curtailment behavior (Abrahams, 1997).
Mortgage curtailment is always an option, not an obligation. Since borrowers are never
obligated to curtail their mortgage, the amount of money observed to be used as a curtailment
payment is some unknown portion of a given borrower's discretionary income. A household
that engages in this behavior has the choice to spend discretionary income in any manner they
see t, but has elected to apply funds towards the principal outstanding on their mortgage.
Curtailment payments are part of an intertemporal household maximization decision in which
households must choose monthly from a menu of options ranging from default to complete
prepayment (Chinloy, 1993). Therefore, rational borrowers engaging in this behavior must
be of the belief that curtailment payments provide the most utility for a given amount of
discretionary income at a given point in time.
Unlike default or prepayment, which end in loan termination, a borrower who makes a
curtailment payment may choose to repeat this behavior several times over the course of the
life of the loan. Fu (1997) nds that records of previous curtailment for a given mortgage
greatly increases the chances that loan will make a curtailment in the future. Although they
do not specically study curtailment, Amromin, Huang, and Sialm (2007) document the
reluctance of households to participate in nancial markets and how paying down existing
debt can be viewed as an alternate method of personal savings.
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A few recent studies have documented the growth and importance of curtailment behavior
in the US mortgage market. In a study of this behavior by American homeowners using
survey data, a household's propensity to save is found to be highly positively correlated with
the probability of mortgage curtailment and liquidity risk also factors into the decision to
make a curtailment payment (Adelman, Cross, and Shrider, 2010). In the exotic loan market,
over 30% of all borrowers with an interest-only feature make a principal curtailment during
the IO period (Janowiak, 2013). Across all loan types, mortgage curtailment has grown in
popularity; controlling for a large set of loan characteristics and local economic variables,
the probability of making curtailment payments increased dramatically since 2003, with
approximately 8% of all monthly mortgage observations containing a curtailment payment
and over 30% of all active loans have made at least one curtailment payment as of June
2011, as previously shown in Chapter 2.
Two previous studies have looked at curtailment and mortgage outcomes in Asian mar-
kets. Curtailment is a popular choice in Asian markets with high household savings rates.
Lin and Yang (2005) nd individuals who curtail their mortgages exhibit dierent behaviors
than those who do not; curtailment is associated with a 85% reduction in default risk and
a 23% higher probability of future prepayment. These behaviors have implications for both
the pricing of and investment in mortgaged backed securities. In a similar study Lin et. al
(2005b) nd that curtailment is the most signicant factor in predicting default probabilities
of a seasoned mortgage pool. They conclude that mortgage modeling for Asian countries
should be dierent than mortgage modeling for western countries.
3.2.2 Strategic Default
In order for a mortgage default to be, at least in part, strategic, it is necessary, but not
sucient that the value of the mortgage exceeds the value of the home.1It is unlikely that
1This is strictly true in non-recourse states.
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a borrower will default if the current value of the home exceeds the current balance of the
mortgage, because if a borrower nds himself unable to make payments he may sell the home
for more than the mortgage balance.
Even if a borrower has a negative equity position, he may choose to continue repayment
of the loan because he has a low current value on the mortgage default option. There
is mixed evidence on what depth of negative equity is necessary to induce a borrower to
default.2 Given the uncertainty about the true market price of a property (given infrequency
of transactions) it is reasonable to assume that the borrower may not know the exact point
in time in which a negative equity position is reached.
However, homeowners with negative equity seem to largely be aware of and respond to
their negative equity position; Melzer (2012) nds borrowers with mortgage debt overhang
respond by reducing investment in home improvements and mortgage principal payments.
Also, related to market prices is the role of liquidity in the housing market. As housing
prices decline, it becomes harder to sell a home; Elul et al. (2010) cite rising illiquidity as an
important factor (in addition to depth negative equity) in strategic default decisions.
Guiso, Spienza, and Zingales (2013) develop a model that shows that strategic default is
a function of three categories of variables: the magnitude of the negative equity position, the
pecuniary (which vary by jurisdiction, see Ghent and Kudlyak (2011)) and non-pecuniary
costs of defaulting (see White (2010) and Seiler et al. (2012)), and the option value of
not defaulting in the current period. In this paper, I acknowledge the potential impact of
all of these components of strategic default, but focus on empirically testing dierences of
the impact of the magnitude of the negative equity position (using estimated current loan
to value ratios) between borrowers with a history of curtailment and borrowers without a
history of curtailment.
2See Vandell (1995) for a review of this literature.
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3.2.3 Mortgage Option Pricing
A mortgage contract may be broadly described as a series of one month options, where at
the beginning of each month the borrower may choose one of several actions ranging from
paying nothing to complete prepayment (Chinloy, 1993). If a borrower chooses to default
on his loan, this is roughly equivalent to the exercise of the embedded put option in the
mortgage contract because in default, the borrower gives up his claim to the underlying
asset, the property. More specically, default can be characterized as a European compound
put option because default only occurs at the time of payment (expiration of the option) and
a borrower who does not default today has the opportunity to default at a later date (Kau
and Keenan, 1995). Alternatively, if the borrower completely prepays the loan (analogous to
a call option), he terminates the mortgage contract. When considering mortgage curtailment,
the borrower is partially prepaying the loan in the current period, but retaining the full range
of options in the next period.
All else equal, the partial prepayment of the mortgage in the current period implies that
the borrower assigns a low value to the default option in the near future; if this was not the
case, the borrower should retain the funds used to undertake partial prepayment because
if the borrower curtails his loan and then defaults, he will not have access to those funds.
At the point a loan enters into negative equity territory, the rational borrower must view
any past curtailments as a sunk cost in the current period; this sunk cost view may become
more pervasive as the negative equity position depends or equivalently the expectation of
future increases in housing prices becomes lower. However, if the curtailment is not simply
a monetary investment, but a signal of the borrower's attachment to the property or an
expression of household preference for lower leverage, then a borrower with past curtailments
may have a lower sensitivity to current price in the decision to default.
Option theory predicts that a borrower will default if the put option is in the money"
by some specic amount. However, as illustrated by Deng, Quigley, and Order (2000),
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the signicant amount of unobserved borrower heterogeneity in the market is important is
explaining the exercise of mortgage options (payment choices). The decision to make curtail-
ment payments is a source of individual heterogeneity which may cause dierences in default
choices, particularly in how default probabilities are impacted by current leverage levels for
borrowers with previous curtailment payments versus those with no history of mortgage cur-
tailment. Mortgage option value changes for borrowers who engage in curtailment not only
through mechanical changes in outstanding balance and future payment schedules as shown
by Chinloy (1993), but also through revelation of updated borrower commitment to loan
repayment.
3.3 Data, Variables, and Summary Statistics
I describe data sources in Section 3.3.1, discuss variables used in Section 3.3.2, and present
summary statistics in Section 3.3.3.
3.3.1 Data
The primary data used in this study is from individual monthly loan-level records from
Blackbox Logic, LLC (BBx).3 BBx covers over 90% of non-agency residential securitized
mortgages including prime, Alt-A, and subprime loans. BBx has detailed mortgage contract
information at loan origination and monthly records of mortgage payment information. BBx
contains information at origination for over 21 million loans as well as approximately 800
million monthly remittance reports4 as of December 2013. The primary sample period of
this study is from June 2006 to June 2012.
The sample is further limited by only examining loans where the mortgaged property
is located in one of the twenty MSAs tracked by the S&P-Case-Shiller Composite 20 home
3Detailed BBx data information is available at http://www.bbxlogic.com/data.htm.
4BBx contains remittance reports from February 1999 to the present.
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price index (CS-HPI). To be included in the sample, a loan must be for a single family
residential property and originated no earlier than January 2001, which reduces the sample
size to approximately 4.3 million loans. Additionally, I only include loans with 15 or 30 year
terms; BBx includes loans with alternate terms (i.e. 10 years, 20 years, or 40 years), but
such loans comprise less than 2% of all loans in the database.
Monthly home price index levels for the twenty major metropolitan areas come from the
S&P Case-Shiller Composite 20 (CS-20) index. I limit my study to the metropolitan statis-
tical areas represented in the CS-20 index.5 The Case-Shiller index methodology provides
a list of counties included in each of the CS-20 areas; loans in the BBx database are also
identied by county as one of the list of variables recorded about the loan at origination.
Included in the sample are loans in these geographic areas for which loan characteristics
at origination and monthly payment information is available. New observations enter the
sample as additional loans are originated and securitized. Mortgages may be seasoned before
they appear as observations in my sample since they only enter the database at the point of
securitization.
To be included in the sample, a loan must be for a single family residential property and
originated no earlier than January 2002, which reduces the sample size to approximately 4.3
million loans. The city specic monthly CS-HPI price levels are used to calculate estimates
of borrowers' current loan to value (CLTV) ratios. Restricting the sample to loans with
valid observations for all of the variables needed to estimated CLTV, the nal sample is
between approximately 0.7 millions and 1.3 million loans for each of the seven years in
the sample period (20062012). There are many reasons an observation could leave the
sample during my period of study, including but not limited to foreclosure or complete
prepayment due to renance or sale of the property. Since the shortest loan term I include
is 15 years and the earliest loan origination date we allow is 2002, no loans will leave our




sample due to completion of the amortization schedule. Given that the CS-20 index is based
on single family residential transactions (which include 1-4 home properties), I exclude large
investment properties (such as apartment complexes) from this analysis.
The city specic monthly CS-HPI price levels are used to calculate estimates of borrowers'
current loan to value (CLTV) ratios. Restricting the sample to loans with valid observations
for all of the variables needed to estimated CLTV, the nal sample is between approximately
0.7 millions and 1.3 million loans for each of the seven years in the period of observation
(20062012).
3.3.2 Variables
This section describes the construction of my dependent variable (default) , my key inde-
pendent variable (an interaction of curtailment and current leverage), and a host of control
variables.
3.3.2.1 Default
Default occurs when a borrower becomes seriously delinquent; in this study I consider any
borrower who is 90+ days delinquent to be in default. This denition also includes bor-
rowers currently in foreclosure or bankruptcy proceedings or if the mortgage is currently
being liquidated. The rationale for this broad denition of default is that for my primary
analysis using logistic regression models I use a cross-section of data to examine a borrower's
repayment status in a single month (June) of each year 20062012.
Given that I am examining a single time point in each year, I may not be observing the
point in time where a borrower enters into serious delinquency; my aim is instead to ascertain
a borrower's repayment status at a single uniform point in time. My dependent variable,
default, is treated as an indicator variable, taking the value 1 if the loan is currently in a
state of default and 0 otherwise. A summary of the default rates for the curtailment and
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non-curtailment groups is presented in Figure 3.1. Note, these default rates are not yearly











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Default Rates
curtailment no curtailment
Figure 3.1: Default by group 20062012
A snapshot default rates in the month of June presented for the curtailment and non-curtailment groups for
each year in the sample.
3.3.2.2 Measure of Historic Curtailment
The key independent variable, historic curtailment, is measured in several dierent ways.
First the remittance records for a loan are searched for a curtailment payment at any point
in itself history. In order for a curtailment event to be considered valid, it must meet the
several criteria.
First, the excess payment in a given month must be at least $100 and the sum of all
curtailments must be greater than $100 for a loan to be identied as a mortgage that exhibits
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curtailment behavior.6 The purpose for setting a minimum value for curtailment is that in
the data set there were many observations that had very small payments that likely resulted
from the borrower rounding the payment amount to the nearest dollar, or even forgetting
the exact amount due; these small amounts likely do not reect a conscious eort on the
part of the borrower to make an eort to make additional principal payment and increase
home equity.
Secondly, there were some observations in which a partial prepayment is recorded for
a given month, and then the following month had an osetting negative partial prepay-
ment recorded. This likely represents a regular payment made early or a similar recording
error that was corrected in the following period. These observations are excluded as are
observations for which the sum of all curtailment payments for a given individual loan is
negative.
The records of curtailment payments in our dataset become unreliable when borrower is
behind on payments, and this issue is exacerbated the greater the delinquency becomes. This
is due in part to not knowing what portion of a payment made by a delinquent borrower in
excess of the amount past due is related to late fees and other related charges. Therefore, I do
not include any curtailment observations for borrowers who are more than 30 days delinquent
in their payments. These loans are still observed in our sample, and if they exhibited
curtailment behavior before becoming delinquent, those curtailment payments would still be
included in my analysis.
Lastly, the partial prepayment must be for less than 90% of the outstanding balance to
be considered a curtailment in our sample. The rationale for this criterion is that a large
partial prepayment of 90% or more of the balance outstanding is eectively a prepayment in
full and therefore not representative of curtailment behavior as I have dened it. Although
6I also set the monthly minimum at $10 and $1,000. Additionally, I undertook a similar analysis where
I did not consider a loan to exhibit curtailment behavior unless the cumulative curtailment amount was at
least $1,000 or the cumulative number of curtailments was above the median number of curtailments for all
borrowers with at least one curtailment. In each of these cases, the results do not materially change.
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individual curtailment payment amounts have a wide range of values7, I treat curtailment
as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the borrower makes a curtailment payment for a given
monthly remittance report, 0 otherwise. At the rst observance of a curtailment record that
ts these criteria, the variable curt_ind takes the value 1 and retains that value for all sub-
sequent loan observations, reecting that loan has a history of curtailment. Additionally, the
number of curtailment payments tting the above criteria was tabulated and is summarized
in the previous chapter in Figure 2.3. The median number of curtailments for a loan where
curt_ind=1 is 8.
In addition to the concept of curtailment as an indicator variable, I consider the cumu-
lative dollar amount of curtailment for each loan, with the thought that the total amount of
funds the borrower has previously committed to the loan as partial prepayments may impact
his sensitivity to price in default. Taking the group of borrowers with previous curtailments,
I divide these borrowers into one of three categories at each year based on the sum of all
their previous curtailment payments. Each variable represents the interaction of an indicator
variable taking the value 1 if the borrower is a member of a given payment group in a given
year, and 0 otherwise and the estimated CLTV for that loan.
The rst group (curt0_50_cltv) is comprised of all borrowers whose previous curtailments
put them in the 0-50 percentile of all curtailing borrowers that year. The second group
(curt50_75_cltv) is comprised of the group of borrowers whose previous curtailment place
them above the 50th percentile up to the 75th percentile of all curtailing borrowers for that
year. The nal group (curt75_100_cltv) have the largest relative cumulative curtailment
amounts for that year, above the 75th percentile of all curtailing borrowers.
The cut-os for each group are adjusted annually to account for the eects of an additional
12 payment periods in which a borrower had the option to make additional payments. For
example, the 50th percentile value for dollar amount of cumulative curtailments ranges from
$982.47 in 2006 to $1,936.69 in 2012. The cut-o points are presented in Figure 3.2.











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Cumulative Curtailment Amounts
50th Percentile 75th Percentile
Figure 3.2: Cutos for Curtailment Groups 2006-2012
This graph presents the 50th and 75th percentile values for cumulative curtailment amount, which are
calculated each year.
3.3.2.3 Current Loan to Value Estimate
Estimated current loan to value (CLTV) is an estimate of current loan to value ratio at
each monthly observation, t=m. This variable is constructed with ve key data points,
the LTV at origination, which includes the mortgage balance at origination, (MBt=0), and
value of the home at time of origination (Vt=0), mortgage balance outstanding at time of
observation, (MBt=m), the Case-Shiller index level for a given city, i, at origination (CS
i
t=0),
and the Case-Shiller index level for that city, i, at the time of the observation (CSit=m). A
precise monthly measure of LTV is not possible, since property appraisals are conducted
infrequently, and even when they are conducted, that information is not part of the data set.
Since each individual's true loan to value ratio is not updated continuously, the measure I
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use for estimating current leverage provides a reasonable proxy for the changing home price
environment the borrower encounters.




(Vt=0 · (1 + ∆CSi)
)
(3.1)
where ∆MB equals the change in mortgage balance from t=0 to t=m and ∆CSi is the per-
centage change in the Case-Shiller index for city i from t=0 to t=m.
Examining how CLTV inuences the propensity to default can oer insight to the borrowers
reacting to not only the change in value of their properties over time, but the amount of
equity they have in their properties. As a borrower's CLTV increases, he is losing equity to
negative price movements faster than he is gaining equity through reducing the mortgage
balance outstanding through making regularly scheduled payments. We would expect such
a borrower may be at higher risk of default.8
3.3.2.4 Negative Equity
A house is considered to have negative equity, or be underwater" if it is currently worth less
than the outstanding mortgage balance owed on the property. Stated dierently, a house
negative equity is underwater. I calculate an estimate of current equity using the CLTV
measure:
CurrentEquityit = 1 − CLTVit (3.2)
If CurrentEquity < 0 then the indicator variable underwater takes the value of 1, otherwise
underwater equals 0. All else equal, I would expect a borrower that is currently in a negative
8I exclude loans with current loan to value estimates of greater than 2 (approximately 0.4% of the
sample) from our sample because these observations likely have erroneous values for some of the inputs used
to calculate this variable. Additionally, we exclude loans with CLTV of less than 0.2, since these loans are
relatively close to being fully repaid and likely exhibit dierent behavior that the larger sample. I also set
the minimum at 0.1 and 0.3 and the results do not materially change.
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equity position, or underwater", to be more likely to enter default than a borrower who is
currently estimated to have positive equity in his property.
3.3.2.5 Measurement of Credit Risk
The borrower's credit quality at origination is largely captured by his FICO score. FICO
scores provide a method of ranking potential borrowers by the probability of having a negative
credit event in the next two years, typically on a scale from 400 to 850. (Most scores are
between 550 and 800.) A negative credit event can be as small as a single missed payment,
or can be a large scale event like foreclosure or bankruptcy.
Borrowers with lower scores have a greater chance of all types and magnitudes of neg-
ative credit events than borrowers with higher scores. Previous studies (e.g.LaCour-Little
(1999),(Pennington-Cross, 2003), and (Ghent and Kudlyak, 2011)) have shown that FICO
score at origination is positively associated with prepayments and negatively associated with
defaults in both the prime and subprime mortgage markets. I would anticipate high credit
quality to be associated with a lower probability of default, all else equal. I use the log of
the FICO score at origination, log_co.
In my sample, the FICO score variable has the highest missing rate among the variables
I use in my analysis (approximately 10% of all loans in the database are missing borrower
origination credit score). Another measure of credit risk, credit category is available for
approximately 98% of loans. Credit categories (prime, alt-a, subprime) are assigned by
the lender at the time of origination based on borrower credit risk and level of loan docu-
mentation. The results do not materially change if I use the larger sample and use credit
category as my measure of credit risk. I chose to present my results with the continuous
FICO variable.
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3.3.2.6 Other control variables
I include several additional control variables in our default models. I include several time
invariant variables, such as the loan's interest rate at origination (origintrtcalc) and dummy
variables for loan type (arm), lien number (lien_2 ), interest-only loans (io_d), prepayment
penalty (prepayment_penalty), loan term (term_30 ), loan purpose (purchase, cash_re,
reg_re), loan origination year (vintage_X ), and city where the property is located (city_X ).
Additionally, I include some time varying control variables for loan age (loanage), current
interest rate (currentintrtcalc)9, and a dummy variable for curtailment history (curt_ind).
A complete list of variables is summarized in Table 3.1.
3.3.3 Summary Statistics
A summary of the default rates for the curtailment and non-curtailment groups is presented
in Figure 3.1. Across all years of the sample period, the loans with past curtailment have a
lower rate of default than loans with no curtailment. Less than 2% of loans with curtailment
defaulted in pre-crisis years, but in 2009 through 2012 between 15% and 19% of loans with
curtailment experience default. However, this is much lower than the non-curtailment group,
which in the same period ranged between 27% and 31% of loans in default, versus less than
5% in the pre-crisis period.
Additional summary statistics by observation year are presented in Table 3.2. The two
groups also vary in terms of other characteristics; for example, borrowers with past curtail-
ment have higher FICO scores. However this dierence is not large and attenuates over time
(a dierence of 32 points in loans observed 2006 versus a 7 point dierence in loans active in
2012). Loans with curtailment histories have larger appraisal values, but again the dierence
becomes smaller between the two groups in towards the end of the sample period.
9Of course, current interest rate will only be time-variant for adjustable rate mortgages.
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Table 3.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
curtail_ind 1 if borrower has made at least one curtailment, 0 otherwise
cum_curt Number of curtailment payments in a loan's history
current_ltv Estimate of current loan to value ratio at time of observation
curtail_currentltv CLTV for borrowers where curt_ind equals 1
nocurtail_currentltv CLTV for borrowers where curt_ind equals 0
curt0_50_cltv CLTV for borrowers where cumulative
curtailment amount up to 50th percentile
curt50_75_cltv CLTV for borrowers where cumulative
curtailment amount 50-75th percentile
curt75_100_cltv CLTV for borrowers where cumulative
curtailment amount 75-100th percentile
arm 1 if adjustable rate mortgage, 0 if xed rate mortgage
ln_co log of borrower FICO score at origination
lien_2 1 if loan is second lien, 0 otherwise
loanage Age of loan from origination in months
origintrtcalc Loan's interest rate at origination
currentintrtcalc Loan's interest rate at time of observation
appraisal Appraisal value of property at loan origination
purchase 1 if loan's purpose was new purchase, 0 otherwise
cash_re 1 if cash-out renance was loan's stated purpose, 0 otherwise
reg_re 1 if renance (no cash-out) was loan's stated purpose, 0 otherwise
io_d 1 if loan is interest-only, 0 otherwise
prepay_penalty 1 if loan contains a prepayment penalty, 0 otherwise
term_30 1 if 30 year loan, 0 if 15 year loan
city_X 1 if property located in given CS-20 city, 0 otherwise
vintage_X 1 if loan originated in a given year, 0 otherwise
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics By Year
2006 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 1,452,926 677 72 197,417 709 64
appraisal 1,724,338 439,995 457,547 196,425 573,337 488,230
LTV_orig 1,724,333 0.74 0.45 196,425 0.72 0.35
current_ltv 1,515,548 0.65 0.22 180,974 0.65 0.22
arm (d) 1,972,110 0.41 0.49 225,606 0.54 0.50
term 30 (d) 1,972,110 0.89 0.31 225,606 0.91 0.29
lien 2 (d) 1,972,110 0.08 0.27 225,606 0.03 0.18
2007 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 1,828,481 678 70 307,320 707 64
appraisal 2,046,801 443,292 448,041 329,035 596,344 554,322
LTV_orig 1,724,333 0.74 0.45 329,031 0.77 0.51
current_ltv 1,780,084 0.70 0.28 300,413 0.67 0.27
arm (d) 2,367,209 0.40 0.49 382,641 0.54 0.50
term 30 (d) 2,367,209 0.89 0.32 382,641 0.91 0.29
lien 2 (d) 2,367,209 0.12 0.33 382,641 0.04 0.20
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Table 3.2 continued
2008 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 1,637,823 682 69 372,871 706 65
appraisal 1,822,854 449,932 457,772 393,260 593,615 532,681
LTV_orig 1,822,833 0.81 0.69 393,257 0.82 0.59
current_ltv 1,608,527 0.81 0.32 352,714 0.80 0.32
arm (d) 2,133,225 0.38 0.49 467,230 0.52 0.50
term 30 (d) 2,133,225 0.90 0.30 467,230 0.91 0.28
lien 2 (d) 2,133,225 0.10 0.31 467,230 0.04 0.21
2009 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 1,294,804 684 69 384,738 701 66
appraisal 1,431,956 457,471 465,551 411,584 577,960 530,664
LTV_orig 1,431,937 0.82 0.68 411,581 0.84 0.61
current_ltv 1,257,687 0.95 0.38 361,263 0.94 0.37
arm (d) 1,692,979 0.36 0.48 487,626 0.53 0.50
term 30 (d) 1,692,979 0.91 0.29 487,626 0.92 0.27
lien 2 (d) 1,692,979 0.09 0.28 487,626 0.04 0.21
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Table 3.2 continued
2010 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 1,007,248 682 69 369,025 695 67
appraisal 1,131,850 451,766 460,095 406,202 552,521 513,141
LTV_orig 1,131,834 0.80 0.60 406,199 0.84 0.58
current_ltv 1,001,947 0.92 0.36 357,608 0.92 0.36
arm (d) 1,330,908 0.35 0.48 481,634 0.54 0.50
term 30 (d) 1,330,908 0.92 0.28 481,634 0.92 0.27
lien 2 (d) 1,330,908 0.08 0.27 481,634 0.05 0.21
2011 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 804,408 681 69 366,444 688 68
appraisal 907,292 442,130 444,053 411,945 513,484 482,339
LTV_orig 907,287 0.79 0.53 411,942 0.85 0.56
current_ltv 808,539 0.95 0.37 361,140 0.97 0.36
arm (d) 1,060,677 0.33 0.47 489,427 0.55 0.50
term 30 (d) 1,060,677 0.92 0.28 489,427 0.93 0.26
lien 2 (d) 1,060,677 0.07 0.26 489,427 0.04 0.20
70
Table 3.2 continued
2012 No curtailment Curtailment
Variable N Mean Std Dev N Mean Std Dev
co 657,146 680 69 357,336 682 69
appraisal 750,458 431,598 426,923 412,292 480,866 449,100
LTV_orig 750,456 0.77 0.47 412,290 0.85 0.54
current_ltv 671,225 0.93 0.35 363,692 0.96 0.35
arm (d) 870,695 0.32 0.46 487,945 0.56 0.50
term 30 (d) 870,695 0.92 0.27 487,945 0.94 0.25
lien 2 (d) 870,695 0.07 0.25 487,945 0.04 0.20
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Interestingly, the group with curtailment has a higher average leverage at origination
than the non-curtailment group, and the gap widens in later years. The average current
leverage is similar between the groups and is lower that the originally leverage for the rst
three years of the sample; from 20092012 the average current leverage is higher than the
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Leverage by Group
Curtail/LTV orig No curtail/LTV orig Curtail/CLTV No curtail/CLTV
Figure 3.3: Original and Current Leverage by Group
lien loans are more prevalent among non-curtailing borrowers, but curtailing borrowers are
more likely to have adjustable rate mortgages. Both groups have a similar proportion of 15
and 30 year loans.
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3.4 Empirical Model and Results
I estimate a logistic regression for each year from 2006 to 2012 using the mortgage status as
observed in June10 of each year to examine if borrowers in the curtailment group dier in their
sensitivity to current market conditions in their default decisions as compared to the group
without previous curtailments. To examine the impact of loan and borrower characteristics
on default, I use the following specication:
Pr(Dit = 1) = φ (Xitβ + Yiγ + δfe+) (3.3)
The dependent variable, default (Dit), is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a state of
serious delinquency or foreclosure is observed for loan i at time t, and 0 otherwise. Pr(Dit)
is the probability that default is observed for loan i at time t. The vector of mortgage
characteristics that vary by time and by individual is given by Xit and includes a curtailment
indicator variable to estimate the eect of individuals' past curtailments on current default
decisions. This includes if the loan the key independent variables, the interaction between
curt_ind and current_ltv to examine the sensitivity of each group to current leverage, as
well as the current interest rate on the loan, if the loan currently has a prepayment penalty,
and the age of the loan.
The vector of mortgage characteristics Yi, is time invariant. This vector includes all of
the origination borrower characteristics including interest rate type and term of the loan,
the purpose of the loan at origination, if the mortgage is a second lien loan, the borrower's
FICO score, and the interest rate at origination. I also control for xed eects, δfe, including
vintage xed eects (base case is 2004) and city xed eects (base case is Dallas), both of
which are known at origination. I expect the curtailment group to respond less to changes
in leverage when predicting their probability of default than the group with no curtailment.
10The choice of June as the yearly point of observation is arbitrary, the results are similar if other months
are chosen.
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Results from the logistic regressions presented in Table 3.3 show that for the key inde-
pendent variables curtail_currentltv and nocurtail_currentltv, each group's probability of
default rises with the estimated current loan to value ratio. Across the sample period, the
variable curtail_currentltv has a smaller coecient than nocurtail_currentltv, which sug-
gests that the curtailment group is less sensitive to negative changes in equity than the
non-curtailment group. However, both the curtailment and non-curtailment groups, have
a positive and signicant coecient on their respective current leverage (CLTV) variables.
This suggests that both groups are sensitive to changing house prices. In other words, even
the curtailment group has some element of strategic behavior in their default decision, but
the eect is smaller in magnitude than that for the non-curtailment group.
For ease of interpretation, I estimate the elasticities of our key variables at dierent values
of current loan to value ratio. These results are presented in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.4. These
















Figure 3.4: Elasticity Estimates
Marginal eects, expressed as elasticities, are estimated for three leverage levels (1, 1.2, and 1.5) for both
the curtailment and non-curtailment groups. A current leverage level of 1 (CLTV=1) corresponds to the
instance in which the estimated house value is exactly equal to the remaining balance on the mortgage.
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Table 3.3: Logistic Regressions for Default
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
nocurtail_currentltv 1.093∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 1.567∗∗∗ 2.218∗∗∗ 2.535∗∗∗ 2.637∗∗∗ 2.850∗∗∗
(44.92) (84.23) (144.12) (183.94) (189.75) (184.76) (184.73)
curtail_currentltv 0.834∗∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.416∗∗∗ 2.071∗∗∗ 2.189∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 2.034∗∗∗
(6.73) (27.67) (66.95) (109.86) (123.75) (117.22) (119.05)
curt_ind -1.276∗∗∗ -0.999∗∗∗ -0.657∗∗∗ -0.516∗∗∗ -0.363∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ 0.00604
(-14.11) (-28.16) (-27.85) (-22.52) (-17.49) (-9.28) (0.29)
arm 0.205∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(15.68) (22.13) (56.07) (57.53) (48.22) (44.95) (44.41)
term_30 0.277∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.0634∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ -0.0101
(10.61) (6.63) (-4.89) (10.25) (9.19) (6.53) (-0.56)
lien_2 -0.0438 -0.229∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.934∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗
(-1.35) (-12.11) (3.58) (57.25) (57.30) (41.94) (55.50)
currentintrtcalc 0.274∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(61.05) (139.09) (225.59) (152.10) (132.41) (137.47) (122.22)
origintrtcalc 0.0773∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ -0.0166∗∗∗ -0.0930∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.108∗∗∗
(21.23) (38.95) (-11.62) (-52.53) (-61.98) (-67.57) (-62.03)
lnco -5.357∗∗∗ -4.547∗∗∗ -3.574∗∗∗ -4.317∗∗∗ -4.876∗∗∗ -4.399∗∗∗ -3.989∗∗∗
(-80.29) (-108.00) (-106.36) (-136.66) (-156.06) (-133.28) (-116.24)
purchase 0.417∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ -0.0219∗∗∗ -0.0547∗∗∗ -0.00894 0.0165∗
(27.97) (34.76) (39.24) (-3.30) (-8.00) (-1.19) (2.08)
cash_re -0.268∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗∗ -0.356∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.0548∗∗∗
(-16.41) (-35.16) (-47.32) (-50.97) (-35.52) (-15.77) (-6.99)
io_d -0.100∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.193∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗
(-5.48) (20.06) (50.79) (38.20) (30.72) (31.45) (28.19)
prepay_d 0.132∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(10.40) (19.25) (43.16) (55.71) (43.41) (29.17) (20.32)
loanagecalc 0.0642∗∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00750∗∗∗ 0.00426∗∗∗ 0.00480∗∗∗ 0.00201∗
(35.77) (50.48) (15.69) (9.20) (5.24) (5.42) (2.20)
_cons 26.02∗∗∗ 20.26∗∗∗ 14.54∗∗∗ 20.88∗∗∗ 25.97∗∗∗ 22.94∗∗∗ 20.82∗∗∗
(57.78) (71.03) (63.17) (95.12) (119.78) (98.69) (84.97)
pseudo R2 0.226 0.197 0.236 0.209 0.198 0.194 0.188
N 1,288,117 1,608,273 1,385,111 1,125,392 971,050 847,803 763,722
t statistics in parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity
vintage and city xed eects included, loans with CLTV>2 or CLTV<0.2 excluded
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.4: Elasticities for Current Loan to Value in Curtailment and Non-curtailment groups
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Estimates at CLTV=1
nocurtail_currentltv 1.048∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 1.253∗∗∗ 1.580∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗ 1.594∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
curtail_currentltv 0.786∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.030) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
N 1,288,117 1,608,273 1,385,111 1,125,392 971,050 847,803 763,722
Estimates at CLTV=1.2
nocurtail_currentltv 1.246 ∗∗∗ 1.151∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗ 1.700∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.130) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
curtail_currentltv 0.935∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.033) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
N 1,288,117 1,608,273 1,385,111 1,125,392 971,050 847,803 763,722
Estimates at CLTV=1.5
nocurtail_currentltv 1.534∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗ 1.705∗∗∗ 1.425∗∗∗ 1.421∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.013) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
curtail_currentltv 1.199∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 1.200∗∗∗ 1.056∗∗∗ 0.942∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.015) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 1,288,117 1,608,273 1,385,111 1,125,392 971,050 847,803 763,722
Delta-method standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The elasticities are estimated at three points corresponding to dierent levels of negative
equity positions, CLTV=1, CLTV=1.2, and CLTV=1.5.11 At CLTV=1, or the point where
the borrower initially crosses the threshold into a negative equity position, a 10% increase
in CLTV is associated with a 10.48% to 16.12% increase in the probability of default in the
non-curtailment group versus a 7.86% to 10.34% increase in the probability of default for
the curtailment group across the sample period.
As the CLTV rises over 1, the risk of default associated with becoming even further
underwater on the loan increases for both groups, but remains consistently higher in the
group without curtailment activity. At CLTV=1.5, a 10% increase in CLTV is associated
with a 12.68% to 17.05% increase in the probability to default, whereas the same increase
11I exclude loans have estimated current loan to value ratios of greater than 2 from our sample. Loans
with CLTVs greater than 2 comprise less than 0.5% of all observations across our sample period and are
likely the result of data errors in one or more of the variables used to estimate CLTV.
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in CLTV is associated with a 9.42% to 12.95% increase in the probability in default for the
curtailment group. Across each of the three CLTVs at which the elasticities are estimated for
the years 20082012, the non-curtailment group always has a statistically signicant higher
estimated elasticity than the curtailment group.12 Borrowers in the curtailment group display
on average approximately 30-40% less sensitivity to current leverage, relative to borrower
the non-curtailment group.
Note that I am not making any claims about the absolute magnitude of strategic behavior
on the default decisions; I am only examining the impact of changes in leverage on the two
groups. If the two groups had the same unobservable propensity to engage in strategic be-
havior I would expect the coecients/elasticities on the two CLTV variables to be the same.
Since I observe consistently lower (and signicantly dierent) values on CLTV variables for
the curtailment group, I assert that this group appears to be less strategic in their default
decision than the non-curtailment group.
Stated dierently, these results would suggest that the curtailment group provides a lower
bound on sensitivity to current leverage (which is a function of borrower payments and
changes in house prices since origination) in the default decision. Recall, the curtailment
group had a low value on the default option at the time of the partial prepayment whereas
the non-curtailment group had not revealed any additional new information about their
commitment to loan repayment, so their option value of default was more uncertain.
The measure of sensitivity of the curtailment group to leverage provides an measure of
the level of exigent strategic default in the market, or in other words this is the minimum
price sensitivity that I would expect to see. By observing the dierence on the estimates of
the impact of leverage between the non-curtailment group and curtailment group I obtain an
estimate of the magnitude of excess strategic default, or stated dierently, this is the portion
of strategic default that is more likely to be avoidable and therefore would be of interest to
investors and policymakers.
12For the years 20062007 the non-curtailment group also has a higher estimated elasticity than the
curtailment group, but this dierence is not always statistically signicant.
77
3.4.1 Cumulative Curtailment Amounts
Using the same methodology from the previous section, I examine the impact of the dol-
lar amount of curtailment on the sensitivity of default. Regression results are presented in
Table 3.3. As expected, the magnitude of the sensitivity of borrowers equity to default, de-
creases uniformly moving from the no curtailment group to the group with the highest dollar
amount of curtailment. In the pre-crisis years of the sample, the sign of the sensitivity vari-
able ips for higher levels of curtailment, although some of the coecients are insignicant
or marginally signicant.
In estimating the elasticities at CLTV=1 and CLTV=1.5 (presented graphically in Fig-
ure 3.5, the biggest decline in sensitivity of price to default occurs as a borrower moves from
the non-curtailment group to the lowest dollar amount curtailment group. At the point
where the borrower is just crossing into negative equity territory (CLTV=1) belonging to
higher dollar amount curtailment groups lowers sensitivity of price in default, and the dier-
ence is signicant although relatively small in magnitude compared to the gap between the
lowest curtailment group and the non-curtailment group. However, this form of the model
illustrates a sharper contrast between default sensitivities that the previous form which con-
sidered all curtailing borrowers together. On average, the curtailing borrowers display only
50% of the sensitivity of the non-curtailing borrowers to current leverage in their default
decisions.
Interestingly, as the negative equity position grows larger (CLTV=1.5) there is no signif-
icant dierence in between the sensitivities to price between the three curtailment groups.
However, there is still a large gap in leverage sensitivity between each of the curtailment
groups relative to the non-curtailment group. On average, during the period 20082012, the
borrowers in any curtailment group display half the the sensitivity to current leverage in
default as borrowers in the non-curtailment group.
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Table 3.5: Logistic Regressions for Default with Cumulative Curtailment Amounts
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
nocurt_cltv 1.127∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 1.471∗∗∗ 2.190∗∗∗ 2.434∗∗∗ 2.529∗∗∗ 2.696∗∗∗
(47.37) (82.89) (141.72) (181.74) (191.18) (183.33) (176.91)
curt0_50_cltv 1.006∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.494∗∗∗ 2.170∗∗∗ 2.213∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗
(7.82) (26.16) (66.11) (109.50) (123.35) (114.92) (114.80)
curt50_75_cltv -0.158 0.221∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗ 1.771∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗ 1.766∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗
(-0.66) (2.94) (34.05) (78.71) (96.91) (90.49) (85.71)
curt75_100_cltv -0.967∗∗ -1.865∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.523∗∗∗ 1.437∗∗∗ 1.324∗∗∗
(-2.62) (-9.80) (-3.13) (38.30) (63.43) (64.33) (62.04)
curt_ind -1.219∗∗∗ -0.847∗∗∗ -0.601∗∗∗ -0.487∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.0638∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗
(-11.76) (-20.68) (-23.85) (-20.64) (-12.98) (-2.99) (3.81)
arm 0.234∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗
(18.03) (28.78) (57.64) (55.94) (41.41) (37.55) (38.28)
term_30 0.403∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗ -0.0708∗∗∗
(10.35) (10.95) (5.88) (9.21) (7.40) (2.58) (-3.68)
lien_2 -0.106 -0.184∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ 1.728∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗
(-1.93) (-8.67) (-11.01) (110.82) (58.57) (36.62) (39.29)
lnco -5.800∗∗∗ -4.823∗∗∗ -3.416∗∗∗ -5.527∗∗∗ -4.410∗∗∗ -3.741∗∗∗ -3.344∗∗∗
(-88.15) (-115.68) (-104.57) (-179.29) (-150.01) (-121.19) (-102.83)
currentintrtcalc 0.319∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗ 0.501∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(75.53) (150.79) (237.49) (206.50) (120.41) (125.21) (104.56)
purchase 0.452∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0176∗ -0.00687
(28.84) (32.22) (30.10) (5.77) (-3.98) (-2.40) (-0.87)
cash_re -0.272∗∗∗ -0.386∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.0545∗∗∗
(-16.37) (-36.48) (-51.11) (-50.69) (-31.72) (-14.27) (-6.99)
io_d -0.0673∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(-3.65) (25.14) (54.21) (29.73) (25.69) (24.45) (20.66)
prepay_d 0.115∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗
(8.80) (15.09) (44.74) (60.24) (53.60) (39.51) (27.45)
loanagecalc 0.0578∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗∗ 0.00202∗ 0.00317∗∗∗ 0.00470∗∗∗ 0.00164
(31.47) (43.45) (14.99) (2.47) (3.93) (5.41) (1.78)
_cons 29.06∗∗∗ 22.28∗∗∗ 13.48∗∗∗ 31.01∗∗∗ 22.84∗∗∗ 18.42∗∗∗ 16.46∗∗∗
(65.80) (79.09) (60.28) (147.09) (112.22) (85.19) (71.17)
pseudo R2 0.242 0.205 0.241 0.183 0.196 0.186 0.182
N 1,281,002 1,608,604 1,470,700 1,083,529 1,008,663 863,523 756,659
t statistics in parentheses, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors used
vintage and city xed eects included, loans with CLTV>2 or CLTV<0.2 excluded
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Figure 3.5: Elasticity Estimates by Curtailment Amount
These graphs report elasticity estimates for borrowers at current estimated leverage levels of 1 and 1.5 for
three curtailment groups (by dollar amount) and the non-curtailment group.
3.5 Robustness Tests
In this section, I present several robustness tests to help verify that the main results are not
driven by subsamples of the data, potential important omitted variables, or by observable
group dierences. First in Section 3.5.1, I present illustrative results for various subsamples,
including splits on loan origination year, loan size, loan type, and credit quality at origina-
tion. Next, in Section 3.5.2 I show results that incorporate zipcode xed eects and census
variables for demographic characteristics at the zipcode level. Finally, I present results for
propensity score matched samples in Section 3.6. In each of these sections, I present for the
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estimated marginal eects for each group at the point where estimated current leverage is
equal to 1.13
3.5.1 Data subsamples
In this section, I examine several subsamples of borrowers for both the curtailment and non-
curtailment groups to verify that the main result is not driven by the inclusion or exclusion
of an identiable subsample of borrowers. First, I examine loans by origination year. This
is to address the concern that borrowers originating loans in 2004 (in the middle of the
real estate boom) are fundamentally dierent than borrowers originating loans in 2007, in
ways beyond observable origination characteristics, which I control for in all specications.
In Figure 3.6, I present results for loans originated in the years 2004-2007 whose payment
status is observed in 2008, 2010, and 2012.
In general, the main result of non-curtailing borrowers having higher sensitivity to current
leverage than curtailing borrowers remains consistent for all loan vintages. Like in the main
sample, the two groups begin to diverge in 2008 and for the later years, the dierences
are quite large. Interestingly although the pattern of the dierences is consistent overage
loan vintage and observation year, the magnitude of the dierence is the largest for loans
originated in 2007.
Borrowers who originated loans closer to point when house prices reached their peak
values saw their equity wiped out sooner than borrowers who had been in loans for a longer
period of time before the crisis. Therefore observing borrowers who curtail, even after their
original equity is likely erased, probably is a stronger indication of intent to repay than
borrowers who chose rst chose a curtailment action while prices were still rising. Therefore,
conditioning group membership on any past curtailment instead of recent past curtailment
likely provides a conservative estimate of the magnitude of our results.








Orig Year 2004 Orig Year 2005 Orig Year 2006 Orig Year 2007
Year of Origination (CLTV=1)
Curtail 2008 No curtail 2008 Curtail 2010 No curtail 2010 Curtail 2012 No curtail 2012
Figure 3.6: Marginal eects by origination year
Marginal eects by origination year are presented for the curtailment and non-curtailment groups. For each
origination year (2004-2007) elasticities are estimated for the curtailment and non-curtailment groups each
year, but only three years are included for ease of presentation.
Next, I examine subsamples of observations based on the original balance of the loan. I
broadly classify the loans into jumbo and conforming sized loans. This designation is based
on the dollar amount of the loan, date of origination, and physical location of the property.14
For the majority of loans in the sample, the conforming loan limit is $417,000. For both
jumbo and conforming loans the sensitivity to current leverage diers in the curtailment and
non-curtailment groups (see Figure 3.7).
14Historical loan limits can be found at https : //www.fanniemae.com/content/factsheet/historical −









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Loan Size (CLTV=1)
 curtail, jumbo no curtail, jumbo  curtail, not jumbo  no curtail, not jumbo
Figure 3.7: Marginal eects by loan size
These results present results both jumbo and conforming sized loans for the curtailment and non-curtailment
groups. In most geographic areas and during the majority of the time frame of the analysis the conforming
loan limit is $417,000.
I now focus on dierences in loan types, namely xed rate mortgages (FRMs) and ad-
justable rate mortgages (ARMs). As shown in Figure 3.8, the dierences between curtailers
and non-curtailers remain for both types of loans. However, the dierences in leverage sensi-
tivity between the curtailment and non-curtailment xed rate borrowers are more dramatic










2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Loan Type (CLTV=1)
 curtail, arm  no curtail, arm  curtail, frm  no curtail, frm
Figure 3.8: Marginal eects for loan types
Presents results for xed rate mortgages (FRM) and adjustable rate mortgages (ARM).
Finally, I split the sample on credit quality at origination. For simplicity, I group bor-
rowers into prime and non-prime groups, as designated by the lender at origination.15 As
shown in Figure 3.9 the non-curtailment groups for both prime and non-prime borrowers
are more sensitive to current leverage in their default decisions that their respective curtail-
ing counterparts. I also considered credit quality based on origination FICO score, and the
results are materially similar, but I chose to present these results based on prime designa-
tion because there is not consensus on what minimum credit score is needed to be a prime
borrower across lenders and time.









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Credit Quality  (CLTV=1)
 curtail, prime  no curtail, prime  curtail, not prime  no curtail, not prime
Figure 3.9: Marginal eects for dierent credit categories
These results present results for prime and non-prime loans, as designated by lender at origination.
3.5.2 Demographic and Geographic Variation
Although ideally I would like to know detailed demographic characteristics about each house-
hold, this information is unobservable. To help address concerns that both curtailment and
default decisions are impacted by variables such as age, education, income, or race I in-
corporate these variables as the most detailed level possible, given data constraints. For
approximately 95% of the mortgage sample, the nest level locational detail I am able to
observe for individual properties is the zipcode in which the house is located. I then ob-
tain variables of interest at the zipcode level from the 2010 US Census and 2011 American
Community Survey and match these variables to the mortgage data by zipcode.
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Given that new demographic information is unavailable yearly at the zipcode level, I
have only one time invariant set of zipcode level characteristics for each loan. The zipcode
level variables included are presented in Table 3.6. I then estimate the default model, now
including the demographic variables and compare in to the results without the inclusion of
the Census variables. Note, the comparison group is slightly dierent than the main result
due to approximately 5% of the observations not having zipcode information available. For
this section I use only the observations with valid zipcodes in both the base and comparison
groups.16
Table 3.6: Census Variables
Variable Description
log_age log median age
per_male percent male (base is percent female)
per_white percent white and black (base is percent other race)
per_black
per_children percent of household with children under 18
per_single percent of unmarried households
per_occupied percent of housing stock occupied
per_owner percent of housing owner occupied
avg_rooms average number of rooms per house
per_1year percent of households living in same resident for
greater than 1 year
log_income log of median income
per_EDU percent of residents with a given highest level of
educational achievement: high school, some college,
associates, bachelors, graduate or professional (base
is less than high school diploma
All variables measured at the zipcode level
Results for the variable of interest, current leverage sensitivity for curtailment and non-
curtailment groups, are presented graphically in Figure 3.10. As I expect, the zipcode level
time-invariant demographic variables add little predictive power to the model, but coecients
on these variables are either in the expected directions (e.g. higher education levels or higher
incomes negatively associated with probability of default) or insignicant. The inclusion of
16These results are virtually identical to the original results.
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these variables does not substantially change the marginal eects on current leverage for our









2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Including Census variables (CLTV=1)
 curt,census  nocurt, census  curt, no census  nocurt, no census
Figure 3.10: Marginal eects with Census variables included
This gure presents results for the curtailment and non-curtailment groups for both a model that includes
zipcode level Census variables and a model without these variables.
Next, to further address the possibility that the results could be driven by observable
dierences in loans in various geographical answers, I examine a model that excludes the
Census variables, but includes zipcode xed eects. First, I identify all zipcodes present
in the sample in the rst year of payment observation, 2006. Then I rank the zipcodes on
number of observations and keep only those loans that are located within the 250 zipcodes
with the most observations at that point in time.17 Although including zipcode xed eects
improves model t noticeably (approximately 4-7% increase in pseudo-R2, depending on the
17There are over 40,000 zipcodes in the US, and over 7,300 with at least one loan observation in the twenty
large MSAs included in our sample.
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year of observation), the relationship between the marginal eects for the two groups of
borrowers remains consistent.
3.6 Propensity Score Matching
Finally, in my series of robustness tests I consider the possibility that the curtailment and
non-curtailment groups of borrowers may be dierent on observable characteristics, and I
wish to control for the observable dierences in groups. To do so, I employ propensity score
matching. This method is appropriate given that there are far more non-curtailing borrowers
than curtailing borrowers(Dehejia and Wahba, 2006); even in 2012, the year with the highest
percentage of observations belonging to the curtailment group, only about 30% of borrowers
have previous curtailments. I employ 1 to 1 matching on all observable characteristics (i.e.
all control variables used in the base model) to form a sample of non-curtailing borrowers
that is the most similar to curtailing borrowers.
Such a sample selection creates a bias against nding a dierence between the two groups
because variables that are predictive of curtailment (see Chapter 2) are also predictive of
default (albeit in the opposite direction). As shown in Figure 3.11, given that I drop a large
portion of our observations to match the relatively rare curtailing borrowers with the most
similar non-curtailing borrowers, the magnitude of the dierence between the groups some-
what attenuates attenuates, but the curtailing group of borrowers is still much less sensitive
to current leverage in default than the non-curtailing group. Even when I compare the non-
curtailers that are the most similar to the curtailing borrowers on all known characteristics,
there is still a substantial dierence in leverage sensitivity between these groups that can
be attributed to unobservable dierences between the two groups of borrowers which is only











2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
With Propensity Score Matching (CLTV=1)
Curtail No curtail
Figure 3.11: Marginal eects for matched sample
This gure presents marginal eects for the matched sample formed using propensity scores.
3.7 Conclusion
In this study, I identify a group of borrowers who have previously revealed a low value on the
default (put) option on their mortgages by making voluntary curtailment payments. Even
though the probability of default is lower for mortgages with a history of curtailment, many
of these previously `good' borrowers experienced default during the recent housing crisis in
spite of having previously engaged in mortgage curtailment.
I nd evidence that borrowers with past curtailments are less sensitive to current lever-
age than borrowers without past curtailments. In other words, borrowers who previously
curtailed their mortgages but do ultimately default, are less likely to engage in strategic
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default than borrowers who have not made any curtailment payments. Although increases
the dollar amount of cumulative curtailment amount seems to lower the sensitivity to price,
this eect lessens as the estimate of current leverage increases. However, the large dierence
in sensitivity of default between borrowers with and without a history of curtailment is large
and signicant over a wide range of estimated current leverage values. This suggests that
the act of curtailment can also be viewed as a dynamically updated signal to the lender of
the borrower's intent and ability to repay the mortgage loan.
The use of curtailment payment information from mortgage remittance reports can pro-
vide new insights into default behavior for both securitizers of and investors in mortgage
backed securities. The information content of curtailment has yet to be fully exploited and
numerous potential other applications and extensions for research exist. Given the ndings
that borrowers who curtail default at lower rates and appear to be less strategic in their
choices when they are observed to default, this behavior could be important in loan modi-
cation policies and decisions. Given the diculties of disentangling the impact of negative
equity on default choices (Foote, Geraldi, and Willen, 2008), a possible extension of this
study is to examine eects of curtailment in the approval of loan modications and the
resulting subsequent re-default rates.
Additionally, evidence relating to strategic behavior in borrowers is important in for-
mulating an appropriate policy response to observed widespread defaults. Dierentiating
between the relative prevalence of strategic or liquidity motivations for default allows for
policymakers to identify the relative importance of house price declines and borrower ability
to pay in defaults.
Given that most information on an individual borrower is collected only at loan orig-
ination, examining borrower payment histories is useful in better understanding borrower
choices post-origination. Specically, examining the mortgage curtailment behavior of bor-
rowers provides a setting in which we can identify borrowers who are less likely to strategically
default, which contributes to a better understanding of borrower default decisions.
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Chapter 4. Income Stability and Mortgage
Default
4.1 Introduction
Were declining house prices the major culprit in mortgage default during the Great Recession
or was default largely a natural outcome of borrower job losses? Answering this question
is surprisingly dicult since very little information is collected on the individual borrower
after mortgage origination. Personal income and employment status are known by lenders
at the time of mortgage loan origination; however, as time passes these variables can change
and impact the ability of the borrower to repay the loan. Therefore, only having information
about the borrower and the loan at time of origination makes it dicult to ascertain if a later
default is more related to liquidity constraints (current ability to pay) or strategic behavior
(current value of the asset).
Negative equity (owing more on the mortgage than the property is currently worth) is a
necessary, but not a sucient condition for default. Conditional upon negative equity, the
ability to pay should impact default rates. This dual trigger (negative equity and job loss)
hypothesis is not new to the mortgage literature (Jackson and Kaserman, 1980; Campbell
and Dietrich, 1983; DeVaney and Lytton, 1995; Elmer and Seelig, 1999; Getter, 2003), but
has received a great deal of attention recently (Foote, Geraldi, and Willen, 2008; Foote,
Kristopher Geraldi, and Willen, 2010; Elul et al., 2010). Among other insights, this research
has highlighted the dicultly of disentangling the relative eects of price declines and income
shocks in borrower default decisions.
Although job loss (or equivalently, the loss of the ability to make regularly scheduled
loan payments) is anecdotally cited as a leading reason for mortgage default, empirical
estimates on the eects of income and unemployment are small compared to the eect of
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nancial characteristics such as FICO scores or loan-to-value ratios. However, individual
information for income and employment status, although collected by lenders at origination,
is not dynamically updated. Debt-to-income (DTI) ratios from loan applications do not oer
much in the way of predictive power in the default models, particularly as time passes since
origination (Foote, Kristopher Geraldi, and Willen, 2010).
The use of proxies for individual level income shocks, such as county or MSA level un-
employment, often result in coecients that are insignicant or very small in magnitude in
default models. Theoretically, income shocks are important in mortgage default (Campbell
and Cocco, 2011); by using proxies for individual level proxies for unemployment status,
unemployment is the strongest predictor of default (Gerardi et al., 2013). Recent research
indicates that the role of unemployment status (and by extension, current income) may be
underestimated due to omitted variables problems (Gyourko and Tracy, 2014).
Such omitted variables problems can lead to bias in estimated parameters when the omit-
ted variables are correlated with the included variables, or inate the disturbance term. In
addition, omitting uncorrelated variables essentially provides a source of unmodeled het-
erogeneity. For limited dependent variable models, however, unmodeled heterogeneity yields
attenuated (shrunk towards zero) parameter estimates (Yatchew and Griliches, 1985), regard-
less of sample size. Attenuation bias does not necessarily aect estimation of the marginal
eects, but it can aect classication or prediction (Ramalho and Ramalho, 2010).
To avoid the complexities posed by interactions among house prices, employment status,
and income, I propose the natural experiment of examining the default decisions of workers
with job security. Specically, I follow governmental workers (including police, reghters,
city administrators, lawyers, public school teachers, and college professors) employed in Clark
County Nevada in 2009, during the midst of the Great Recession, to examine the sensitivity of
their default decisions to house prices relative to the general population. Currently employed
governmental workers not only have an income, but also have more security with regard to
future income, and are less likely to have experienced a material pay cut than private sector
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workers. In addition, governmental workers have health insurance and often enough paid
sick leave so that short term health problems do not trigger loss of income. In other words,
all individuals in the government employees portion of our sample are employed in FY2009-
10 and on average have relatively low expected future income volatility. Consequently, the
potentially confounding eects of income shocks in mortgage payment decisions should be
minimized among this group as compared to the general population.
Traditional mortgage data has great detail on the loan and property, but little on the
borrower. Moreover, this information is known at loan origination, but it may become less
relevant as time passes. Insofar as mortgage research struggles with omitted variables prob-
lems, I augment my data with public records to include individual specic characteristics of
the homeowner's sex, age, marital status, and political aliation. Additionally, for govern-
mental workers, we observe their current salary, job title, and place of employment. Although
variables such as profession and income may directly aect the propensity to default, all of
the variables may be correlated with other unobserved variables, such as wealth and risk
preferences.
The purpose of this paper is to examine (1) whether including a measure of post-
origination income stability makes a fundamental dierence in the estimated sensitivity of
the default decision to housing prices; and (2) what dierence including additional variables
(employment status, income, personal characteristics) makes to improving the t of mortgage
default models.
I nd that borrowers with known income stability and documented income are equally
sensitive to price in the default decision as the general population of borrowers, whose current
income and employment status is unknown. This result is robust to marital status, house
price range, and several denitions of default.
Additionally, I nd that age, sex, marital status, profession, and political aliation all
exert a statistically signicant impact on the default decision. Collectively, these variables
materially improve model t, particularity in samples with higher levels of borrower hetero-
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geneity. For example, employment as a professor or K-12 teacher lowers the probability of
default relative both as compared to other governmental employees and well as compared
to the general population. Nonetheless, we nd that introduction of these previously omit-
ted variables does not greatly change the importance of house prices in predicting default.
Therefore, it appears that the new variables used in this study are not heavily correlated
with house prices. Consequently, the new variables have more of an inuence on t than on
the marginal eect of housing prices on default.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I present motivation for using the
controlled setting of government employees to study mortgage defaults and detail the data
used in this study in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 describes key variables and presents summary
statistics, section 4.4 introduces the empirical models employed, and section 4.5 presents
results. Finally, section 4.6 summarizes the relevant ndings and suggests areas for future
research.
4.2 Data
Section 4.2.1 outlines the setting for this study. The dierent data sources used in this paper
are described in Sections 4.2.2- 4.2.4. Section 4.2.2 describes the wage data, section 4.2.3
describes the property and foreclosure records, and section 4.2.4 describes data obtained
from voter registration records. Lastly, section 4.2.5 describes how the individual datasets
were combined.
4.2.1 Clark County
Using the setting of Clark County Nevada for this analysis is helpful in many ways. A major
metropolitan statistical area, Las Vegas, is located entirely within the county. Therefore,
I only need to obtain one county of public employment records, voter registration records,
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and property records to conduct inference about a large city. This is in contrast to cities like
Denver, CO (10 counties), Charlotte, NC (6 counties), or Dallas, TX (12 counties). Clark
County is geographically large, so anyone employed in Clark County almost certainly resides
within county limits and residents of the county, if they are employed, are likely to be work
within the county.
Additionally, Clark County has well organized digitized public records that make con-
struction of our individual level dataset containing property, employment, and demographic
records feasible.1 Also, the Las Vegas metropolitan area was one of the hardest hit areas
in the mortgage crisis. The overall high frequency of mortgage delinquency helps in the
estimation of the default models in this study.
4.2.2 Wage Data
There are several advantages to studying nancial decisions of public sector employees. Per-
haps most importantly, for these workers the name, job title, place of employment, and
salary is information of public record. There is a broad spectrum of job categories repre-
sented within the public sector including lawyers, accountants, administrative assistants, IT
professionals, custodians, teachers, police, and reghters. Also, public employees typically
have higher job security than private sector employees in comparable positions as well as
less income volatility. Additionally, medical and sick leave benets typically available to
full-time governmental employees help insulate these borrowers against default due to illness
or medical expenses. While this is true in cities across the nation, it is especially pertinent
in Clark County. Since the Las Vegas metropolitan area has a large portion of the popu-
lation that is employed by industries (such as hospitality, gaming, and entertainment) that
are quite sensitive to business cycle uctuations. In comparison, public sector employees
have much less income volatility and uncertainty. Therefore, a public sector employee has
1I would especially like to thank the employees of the non-prot organization TransparentNevada for
making many of the public employment records for 2009 available in a spreadsheet format.
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the knowledge that in absence of voluntary job change, her future employment status and
salary level are relatively stable and predictable as compared to private sector employees and
should factor in that knowledge when making major nancial decisions, such as purchasing
a home.
Public sector salary records were collected from eight dierent sources including county
employees, city of Las Vegas employees, and colleges located within Clark County, Nevada.
Many employers had several years of salary records available, but the largest sample during
the housing crisis was obtained using employment records from 2009. Employment records
are described in further detail in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Clark County Public Sector Employers, 2009
Employer Total Homeowner Proportion
Observations & Matched
Clark County- General 11,591 1,472 0.1270
Clark County School District 32,953 3,930 0.1193
College of Southern Nevada 1,260 246 0.1952
Desert Research Institute 310 14 0.0451
Nevada State College 149 16 0.1074
Nevada System of 210 9 0.0429
Higher Education System Admin.
University of Nevada at Las Vegas 3,487 629 0.1804
Metro Las Vegas 6,276 1,004 0.1599
Total 56,242 7,333 0.1304
4.2.3 Property and Foreclosure Data
Information about individual homeownership and housing transactions was collected from
the Clark County Property Assessor's Records, which is composed of three parts: assessor
records, sales records, and default records. The records are complete through 2011, but since
I am using salary records from 2009-10, I exclude 2011 sales records from the sample. The
rst set, property assessor records, contains information on housing characteristics including
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a recent assessment of market value of the property, the age of the property as well as
information on variables such as address, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, and square
footage of the structure and the lot.
Sales records include information on property transactions for every single family property
in Clark County. Variables I use from sales records include original date of sale of each
property, information about additional liens on each property, loan amount at time of the
original transaction, and the loan type (xed or adjustable rate mortgage).
Default records include the date of each notice of default led against each property in
Clark County. Using this information I can ascertain if a individual received a notice of
default during the relevant time period or not. We use this information as the dependent
variable in the empirical specications predicting default.
Each of these datasets has unique identiers for each property and each transaction
so that a property or individual can be linked across the three property records datasets.
Therefore, I can match a default with a particular individual at a particular address to the
record of the same individual buying the same property in the sales records as well as have
all the (largely) time invariant characteristics about the specic property.
4.2.4 Voter Registration and Additional Demographic Data
Voter registration records contain several demographic variables of interest. Much of the
information supplied by individuals upon registering to vote in a particular county is a matter
of public record. In Nevada, voter registration is often conducted concurrently with driver's
license and motor vehicle registration, which improves voter registration rates. Voter records
obtained from the Clark County Department of Elections are currently as of September 2013
and include records of both active and inactive voters.
An inactive voter is dened as a voter who has been sent some ocial correspondence
by Clark County and as a result of that correspondence the county has determined that
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the individual no longer resides at that residence. When an individual moves within Clark
County he may update his address (and never reach inactive status) or re-register under
his new address (and thus have an active and an inactive record for the same individual).
If an individual moves outside of Clark County he will eventually be classied as inactive.
Periodically, inactive voting records are purged from the system; I have records of inactive
voters back to 2009.
Overall, there are 864,772 active voters in Clark County as of September 2013, as well
as approximately 300,000 inactive voting records, many of which are for individuals who
have an active record. To put this in perspective, as of July 2013, Clark County had a total
population of approximately 2 million (including residents under the age of 18).2 Thus, the
voting records provide information on the vast majority of adult residents of the county.3
In addition to information that is specic to elections (congressional district, school
board district, record of participation in past four years of elections) the data set provides
information on the registered political aliation of each individual. The full name, address
(current as of 2013 or date that inactive status begun), gender, year of birth, date of original
voter registration are provided for each voter.4
To infer martial status, I use the raw name records from the property assessor records.
If an individual is legally married at the time the property is purchased, in Clark County
both spouses names must appear on the deed. In the case of a property that is jointly owned
the property records list both names with an &" symbol between the names. Therefore,
if a property record does not contain an ampersand, we infer that the owner is single.
Additionally, individuals who are not married but choose to own property jointly will be
counted as married by this criteria. Of course, since these values are taken from assessor
records, it is possible that singles may have gotten married or married couples may have
2From 2013 Census Bureau estimates.
3Many thanks to Lorena Portillo of the Clark County Department of Elections for assistance in obtaining
and interpreting the registration and elections data.
4Most of these variable eld are well populated; however, a value for gender is missing for approximately
30% of all voter records.
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divorced since the deed was recorded, but using this variable to infer marital status is still
informative.
4.2.5 Matching Criteria
First, employment records are combined into single dataset that includes elds for rst name,
middle name (if available), last name, job title, and 2009 wages. A unique identier was
generated for each employee. Next, employment records are ltered in an attempt to exclude
records from employees who are not full time. First, if the employee has temporary" in their
job title, they are dropped from the sample. Next, if the employee has a wage of less than
$15,000 they are dropped from the sample.5
Property sales records are ltered so that only individuals owning residential property
remain in the sample. If the owner's name included any of the following words, it is dropped:
LLC, Inc, Residential, Property, Properties, Construction, Finance, Resort, Vacation, Mort-
gage, Financial, Global, Bank, Home, Security, Securities, Services, Servicing, Nevada, Fund,
Wells Fargo, Consultant, or Series. All of the public property records also include identiers
so that information can later be extracted from the sales, assessor, and foreclosure datasets.
Next, exact matches using names are found between property sales records and voter
registration records. On the rst pass, here the rst, middle, and last name must match
between both datasets. The match will be considered unique if it matches only a single
identier given for each individual on the voter registration records. An individual may have
multiple voter registration records, due to change of address or change in other personal
information, but each person will have a unique ID number.
5Minimum wage changed from $6.55 to $7.25 in July 2009. A full-time employee (40 hours per week/52
weeks per year) earning minimum wage would have earned $14,456 in 2009. (For additional details on the
minimum wage see: http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm.)
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An individual is allowed to match multiple property records because he may have moved
several times during his tenure in the county. As a second check, rst and last name must
match exactly, but middle name is allowed to match only using initials, so long as the match
is unique (In other words, in on data set if an individual's middle name is recorded asN."
and the other Nathan," but rst and last name match exactly and there are no duplicates,
this is considered an exact match.)
Additionally, if one or both datasets have no value for middle name, but rst and last
name match and the match is unique, this will be considered a successful match. Although
addresses on the voter records and property records typically correspond with one another,
I do not use this information to match observations in forming the initial sample because of
the possibility that the individual has moved since 2009 and the voter records used in the
study go through October 2013. I attempt this matching technique rst only using active
voter records and then repeat the process using inactive voter records to obtain additional
matches that had no record as an active voter. Then, using the same method we match
employment records to the combined property and voting records by full name.
Next, using the unique identiers on the property records, we merge in assessor record
variables as well as foreclosure variables. In the case of multiple records in the sales dataset
for a given individual, we keep only the rst ve records. In the sample, over 99% of property
owners have ve or less sales records for the same property. Subsequent records for the same
address and same individual may indicate renancing or new liens against the property. If
a multiple lien indicator is present anywhere in the rst ve transactions, I consider the
property to have a second lien. After capturing possible second liens on the property, we
keep only the rst records for the individual at that address and consider the date of that
transaction to be the original sales date. Similarly for the foreclosure variable, I nd default
ling notices (up to ve) for each owner at each property. If any of these default notices
occurred in 2009, I assign a value of 1 for foreclosure_activity for that individual, else this
variable will take a value of zero.
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At this point, the single property record with sales, assessor, and foreclosure information
may match several records on the voter data, due to registration or address changes in the
voter registration process. It is entirely reasonable for a true exact match to have several
records. However, a small subset of records several dozen matches, which indicates that a
true exact match may not have been made. For example John Smith" (with no middle name
on both datasets) may have matched exactly, but because this is a common name, we may
be capturing several individuals with the exact same name. Therefore, I drop individuals
who have more than ve records.6 I then keep only one record for each individual, which is
the sample I use for the analysis in this study. Overall, I consider this to be a conservative
matching approach, which likely downward biases the true number of matches that exist in
the data.
4.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
From 2008-2010 approximately 9% of all single family owner-occupied residential properties
received at least one notice of default. Among the groups of county employees over the same
time period, the Clark County School System employees defaulted at a signicantly lower
level (4.8%) than the general population and employees of the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas or Nevada State College also defaulted at a much lower rate (3.2%) than the rest of
the county. A complete list of variables used is provided in Table 4.2. Detailed summary
statistics are provided in Table 4.3.
6I experimented with using dierent cutos for number of records and got similar sample sizes. However,
using a cut o of less than 3 appears to exclude many unique matches and greater than 10 appears to include
many non-unique matches.
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Table 4.2: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description Source
foreclosure_activity 1 if a notice of default led, 0 otherwise Property Records: Foreclosures
lnmarketvalue log of most recent home value Property Records: Assessor
houseage age of property, in years Property Records: Assessor
lnloanamount log of loan amount Property Records: Sales
frm 1 if mortgage is xed rate loan, 0 otherwise Property Records: Sales
lien_2 1 if more than 1 lien on property, 0 otherwise Property Records: Sales
yearssincepurchase number of years since property rst acquired by individual Property Records: Sales
age_2009 age of individual in 2009, in years Voter Registration Records
female 1 if individual female, 0 if male Voter Registration Records
female_age interaction of female and age_2009 Voter Registration Records
republican 1 if individual registered as Republican, 0 otherwise Voter Registration Records
democrat 1 if individual registered as Democrat, 0 otherwise Voter Registration Records
otherparty 1 if individual registered as member of a third party, 0 otherwise Voter Registration Records
noparty 1 if individual has no registered political aliation, 0 otherwise Voter Registration Records
lnsalary log of salary in FY2009-10 Employment Records
gvmt_emply 1 if individual employed by Clark County, 0 otherwise Employment Records
lawyer 1 if individual employed as lawyer or judge, 0 otherwise Employment Records
teacher 1 if individual employed as K-12 teacher, 0 otherwise Employment Records
prof 1 if individual employed as a professor, 0 otherwise Employment Records
police 1 if individual employed as police ocer, 0 otherwise Employment Records
re 1 if individual employed as reghter, 0 otherwise Employment Records
102
4.4 Empirical Strategy
I estimate a series of logistic regressions to examine the impact of individual property, em-
ployment, and demographic variables on the probability of mortgage default. To examine
the impact of property characteristics and individual demographics on default, I use the
following specication:
Pr(Di = 1) = φ (Xiβ + Ciθ) (4.1)
The dependent variable, default (Di), is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a state of
serious delinquency or foreclosure is observed for the property owned by individual i in the
given time period, and 0 otherwise. Pr(Di=1 ) is the probability that a default is observed
for individual i. The vector of characteristics that relate the mortgaged property owned
by individual i in 2009-2010 is given by Xi and includes the log of property market value
(lnmarketvalue), the log of the loan amount (lnloanamount), a dummy variable for mortgage
type (frm), a dummy variable indicating if there is a second lien on the property (lien_2 ),
the number of years the individual has owned the property (yearsinhouse), and the age
of the property in 2009 (houseage). All of these variables, with the exception of current
market value, are known by the lender at origination. I use interactions between government
employment indicator variable and the loan amount and current property value to test if the
two groups of borrowers dier in their sensitivity to price in their default decisions.
In addition to the property characteristics and salary information, the vector Ci contains a
series of dummy variables for political aliation (republican, otherparty, noparty7), a dummy
variable for gender (female and gender_unknown8, age of the individual in years (age_2009 ),
an interaction between age and gender (female_age), a dummy variable for marital status
(single), and a series of dummy variables for profession (lawyer, teacher, prof, police, re9).
These characteristics may be unknown by the lender (i.e. political aliation) or known and
7The omitted category is democrat.
8The omitted category is male.
9The omitted category is otherjob.
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics
Default Variables N Mean Std. Dev.
Government Employees 2008-2010 7,333 0.064 0.245
Other Clark County Residents 2008-2010 372,176 0.090 0.286
Government Employees 2009-2010 7,333 0.051 0.221
Other Clark County Residents 2009-2010 631,226 0.070 0.255
Demographic and Employment Variables N Mean Std. Dev.
County Employees
salary 7,333 64,743.70 34,484.57
frm 7,333 0.768 0.422
lien_2 7,333 0.100 0.300
lnloanamount 6,949 11.68 0.782
lnmarketvalue 7,322 11.805 0 .579
single 7,333 0.265 0.441
female 7,333 0.562 0.496
male 7,333 0.280 0.449
unknown_gender 7,333 0.158 0.365
yearssincepurchase 7,333 8.335 2.272
houseage 7,322 17.414 12.637
age_2009 7,333 46.685 12.270
republican 7,333 0.344 0.475
democrat 7,333 0.475 0.499
otherparty 7,333 0.044 0.204
noparty 7,333 0.138 0.345
lnsqft 7,300 7.209 0.429
Other Clark County Residents
frm 372,176 0.697 0 .459
lien_2 372,176 0.113 0.316
lnloanamount 339,414 11.736 0.793
lnmarketvalue 371,390 11.758 0.647
single 372,176 0.384 0.486
female 372,176 0.338 0 .473
male 372,176 0.391 0.488
unknown_gender 372,176 0.271 0.444
age_2009 372,176 49.774 15.665
yearssincepurchase 372,176 7.903 2.526
houseage 371,308 16.962 13.349
lnsqft 369,011 7.19 0.454
republican 372,176 0.353 0.478
democrat 372,176 0.434 0.496
otherparty 372,176 0.051 0.220
noparty 372,176 0.162 0.369
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not directly used in the lending decision process (i.e. gender, age, marital status). Again,
they may be correlated with other variables used default models, or may aect t. These
personal characteristics may be correlated with unobservable variables, such as education,
wealth, or personal risk-taking preferences.
Next, to examine the eect of adding information on current salary on probability of
default, we estimate a similar model, but include the log of salary for individual i in 2009.
It is important to note that all individuals included in the sample were employed by Clark
County in FY2009-10, and thus all have positive values for income.
Pr(Di = 1) = φ (Xiβ + lnsalaryiγ + Ciθ) (4.2)
I would expect that salary will be negatively related to the probability of default. Current
salary is usually omitted from default models; if salary is predictive of default, it is either
correlated with loan and property variables (such as those used in the model specied in
Equation 4.1) or with the error term in such models.
Finally, as a robustness check, I estimate Equation 4.1 for several subsamples, including
single and married borrowers.
4.5 Results
Tables 4.4 4.6 present results for dierent groups of Clark County employees. For each group
of employees, results are presented for the three groups of models described in Section 4.4.
Table 4.4 presents the main results. Consistent with theory and other mortgage default
models, the probability of default is reduced for borrowers who have xed rate loans (average
marginal eect=-5.0%), higher current property market values (both among governmental
employees and all other residents) and default risk is higher for borrowers with second lien
loans (average marginal eect=5.9%) and borrowers with higher loan amount (among both
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groups of employees). These results are similar for both specications of default (2008-2010
and 2009-2010)10
Table 4.4: Clark County Residents, Full Sample





















10For simplicity, the remainder of the models report results for the 2008-2010 period for default, however
all results are robust to the 2009-2010 period as well as just the 2009 period.
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Table 4.4 continued
































pseudo R2 0.131 0.103
AIC 186901.6 161888.4
N 344,413 344,413
t statistics in parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the property level
* p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
The two interaction terms for lnmarketvalue as well as lnloanamount have similar co-
ecients for both government employees (those with secure, known incomes) and the re-
mainder of the population (whose employment status and income are unknown). For-
mally, the coecients for govt_emply_lnloanamount (average marginal eect=5.5%) and
not_govt_emply_lnloanamount (average marginal eect=6.6%) are statistically indistin-
guishable (Wald test for equality of coecients p=0.26). The coecients for the two market
value (price) coecients (average marginal eects for government and general population are
-6.4% and -6.3%, respectively) are also statistically indistinguishable (Wald test for equality
of coecients, p=0.89). These results provide evidence that both groups of borrower have
similar sensitivities to price in default.
Among the demographic variables, the individual's age (average marginal eect=0.6%) is
positively associated with default, as is being female (average marginal eect=1.9%). How-
ever, the interaction of gender and age reveals that higher default probability associated
with females reverses with age (beginning at approximately age 32). As compared to the
base group of individuals who are registered Democrats those registered as Republicans or
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who have no declared party aliation have a lower probability of default (average marginal
eects= -1.6% and -0.7%, respectively). Additionally, single borrowers have a higher proba-
bility of default (average marginal eect=2.6%). House age, number of years since purchase,
and house size are all negatively associated with default. Finally, job title or classication
appears not to matter for most groups, with one notable exception, those employed as ed-
ucators. Those employed as university professors have a signicantly lower probability of
default (average marginal eect= -10.0% as do those employed as K-12 teachers (average
marginal eect=-2.6%).
Table 4.5 presents results only for individuals who are known government employees.
This sample is a relatively homogeneous group of individuals. Among the characteristics
they share are: homeowners in Clark County, Nevada, work in the public sector (have
relatively low income volatility), and are known to be employed during FY2009-10. For this
group of borrowers with known salary, the coecient for the log of current salary is negatively
related to default (but only marginally improves model t.) Despite all the similarities of the
workers in this sample, several individual characteristics are still informative in predicting
default (gender, indicator for employment as a professor, martial status).11 Other individual
characteristics that were signicant in the main model have similar point estimates, but are
no longer statistically signicant. If this analysis were extending to a group with greater
heterogeneity, we would expect the predictive power of individual characteristics to increase.
Table 4.5: Clark County Residents, Government Employees




11The standard errors in all the models presented in this analysis are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered on the property level.
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Table 4.5 continued
















































pseudo R2 0.126 0.129
AIC 2935.0 2925.5
N 6,923 6,923
t statistics in parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the property level
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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The nal model, presented in Table 4.6, shows results by borrower martial status. The
results are similar to the main specication. Although the coecient estimates are less
precise for single government employees (due to relatively small sample size of approximately
1,200), the coecients are still statistically indistinguishable from the full sample both on
loan amount and market value variables. Most importantly, for single borrowers (those who
are unlikely to have substantial unobserved income, such as a spouse's salary) the results hold.
Also of interest, the model has higher predictive power for the group of single borrowers.12
Table 4.6: Full Sample, by martial status















12The dierence in model t is even more stark for narrower denitions of default.
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Table 4.6 continued







































pseudo R2 0.131 0.103
AIC 87161.5 99386.5
N 125,972 218,422
t statistics in parentheses, standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the property level
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
4.6 Conclusion
Although job loss is often anecdotally cited as motivation for mortgage default, the inability
to observe individual ability to pay (through employment status or current income) after
loan origination makes it dicult to empirically test the impact of unemployment on default
probabilities. Controlling for employment status by a sample of individuals who are known
to be employed in FY 2009-10 and have relatively low income volatility, we observe lower
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levels of default than in the general public, but not an absence of default activity. I show
that although homeowners with relatively high income stability and known employment
have lower absolute rates of default, they are equally price sensitive in default as the general
population. This suggests that these defaults are not solely liquidity defaults (inability to
pay), but these defaults have at least some strategic component (sensitivity to price) to them.
Also, I provide evidence that this strategic component is similar in magnitude for the entire
sample. This nding suggests that even though current income and employment status are
important to default decisions, all borrowers have a similar level of price sensitivity.
Additionally, borrowers' default decisions are sensitive to nancial variables typically
used in default models, such as home value and loan amount, but even after controlling
for these variables, for the group of government employees with known salaries, we nd
that current salary amount is negatively associated with default. The inclusion of individual
level demographic variables helps control for unobservable borrower heterogeneity, which can
lead to parameter attenuation, as well as improve the predictive power of default models.
Disentangling the eects of housing price declines and income shocks can aid policymakers
as well as investors in developing better responses to observed mortgage defaults.
By moving away from reliance on aggregate proxies for theoretically important vari-
ables, such as income and employment, the understanding of the importance of borrower
heterogeneity in nancial outcomes can be better understood. Although this study focuses
on a single US county, similar datasets could certainly be constructed for other locales.
Incorporating individual level data from public records into mortgage models oers many
possibilities for further research. The addition of nancial and non-nancial individual level
characteristics gleaned from public records oers an avenue to reduce the omitted variables
problem in mortgage research .
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusions
5.1 Summary
This dissertation presents three essays that each contribute to the literature in mortgage
debt payment choices. In the rst chapter, I provide an overview of the American mortgage
market in the context of aggregate consumer debt and household nancial decisions. In the
second chapter, I examine mortgage curtailment, or voluntary extra partial prepayments.
I provide evidence that this behavior is associated with widening dierentials in interest
rates at origination and current interest rates as well as changes in housing prices. After
controlling for these factors as well as a host of variables related to the loan terms, I show
that the propensity to curtail mortgage debt has been increasing since 2004. This predates
the aggregate trend of consumer deleveraging, which did not begin until the Great Recession.
The third and fourth chapters explore the concept of strategic mortgage default, or the
instance of a borrower repudiating her outstanding mortgage debt, despite the ability to make
payments, as a reaction to declines in housing values. The third chapter uses the concept
of curtailment, rst introduced in the second chapter, to identify a group of borrowers that
should theoretically have lower instances of strategic default, or stated dierently, contingent
on their ability to make scheduled loan payments, they should be less sensitive to current
levels mortgage leverage than their counterparts without previous curtailments. I empirically
conrm this prediction by showing that borrowers with previous curtailments have 30-50%
less sensitivity to current mortgage leverage than borrowers without previous curtailments
in the decision to default.
The fourth chapter uses a similar framework of comparing two groups sensitivity to mort-
gage curtailment, but now examines the impact of income on borrowers' default decisions. I
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collect information on a group of homeowners that are government employees whose income
status and salaries are known during my sample period. Additionally, this group of employees
has higher than average income stability. These homeowners have observable income to make
mortgage payments during the sample period and given their professions, have much lower
unemployment risk than the general population. Indeed, this group of borrower defaults
less frequently than the general population, whose employment status after loan origination
is observable. However, when I compare this group's sensitivity to current leverage in the
default decision, I nd that both groups are equally sensitive to current leverage levels. Both
the third and fourth chapters results suggest that policies put in place to alleviate widespread
defaults that target ability to pay (liquidity defaults) without addressing depressed property
price levels (strategic defaults) will have limited eectiveness.
5.2 Concluding Remarks and Future Research
Will the trend of borrowers infusing extra equity into their mortgages via curtailment con-
tinue? Certainly this will be a function both changes in the mortgage market as well as in
borrowers' perceived opportunity cost for their discretionary funds. If levels of disposable
income remain constant, changes in curtailment behavior will depend largely on households
consumption preferences and risk aversion levels. First, curtailment will depend on willing-
ness to enter into riskier nancial investments, such as the stock market. Additionally, the
propensity to curtail will likely change as the low interest rate regime that has prevailed
since the crisis eventually gives way to higher rates (although the timing of this change is
unknown).
If rates of return on certicates of deposit or savings accounts increase above the house-
hold's current mortgage rate, the purely nancial incentives to curtail lessen. However, since
mortgage curtailment is a method to accelerate debt repayment, as more households enter
retirement age and may have a reduced taste for debt, curtailment may continue at high
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rates, irrespective of movements in the stock market or prevailing interest rates. To the
extent that curtailment is a revelation of a households' changing preferences for holding
debt, curtailment levels may increase as the recovery continues and household discretionary
income increases.
Furthermore, although curtailment is an embedded option in the mortgage contract, the
value of this option is not truly known. For example, a borrower who chooses a 30 year
mortgage can structure his payments such that the loan is repaid over 15 years. However,
such a borrower will repay a larger amount than an identical borrower who chose a 15 year
loan because of interest rate dierential between the two loan types, but will retain the right
to revert to the lower payments required on the 30 year schedule if his nancial position or
preferences change during the life of the loan.
As the era of high defaults moves further into the past, eventually prepayment risk will
regain prominence in the minds of lenders and investors. To the extent that curtailment is
associated with a lower default risk, particularly a lower strategic default risk, what is its
connection to full mortgage prepayment? To the extent that a borrower may choose to infuse
equity into a mortgage in order to gain eligibility to renance at a lower rate, curtailment
may be positively associated with prepayment risk. However, when interest rates rise, the
incentive for existing mortgagors to renance for interest rate savings vanishes. In such an
environment, observed curtailments may be primarily related to household savings behaviors,
and could potentially have a negative relation to early termination through full prepayment.
Regardless of the future strength or weakness in the real estate market, it is likely that
the demand for additional individual information that is predictive of mortgage outcomes
will continue to grow. To this end, public records are a rich eld for mining individual infor-
mation that can be used by lenders and investors to update post-origination risk proles of
mortgages. Additionally, such information can be used to develop new investment products.
To the extent that household wealth for homeowners continues to be largely concentrated
in their residences, there are potentially additional insights in the area of household nance
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Appendix: Additional Tables
In this appendix, I provide additional tables. Table 5.1 presents a correlation matrix for
the main variables used in the analysis undertaken in Chapter 2. Table 5.2 presents the full
results for the main regression specication in Chapter 2 including coecient estimates for
all xed eects used in the model.
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Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix
Variable neg_eq sav prem LTV_orig arm term_30 co risk prem jumbo pp_penalty doc_low doc_unk
neg_eq 1.0000
sav prem 0.2357 1.0000
LTV_orig 0.2323 0.1371 1.0000
arm 0.0891 −0.0653 0.2174 1.0000
term_30 0.1016 0.0460 0.2439 0.2605 1.0000
co −0.0381 −0.2838 −0.1912 −0.1590 −0.0836 1.0000
risk prem −0.1206 −0.6373 −0.1841 0.1525 −0.0195 0.3867 1.0000
jumbo −0.0294 −0.1292 −0.1147 −0.0235 −0.0136 0.2487 0.1320 1.0000
pp_penalty 0.0172 −0.0693 0.1181 0.1849 0.0809 −0.2242 0.0544 −0.1389 1.0000
doc_low 0.1319 −0.0473 −0.1171 −0.0608 −0.0217 0.2292 0.1395 0.0381 −0.0387 1.0000
doc_unk −0.1466 0.0723 0.1210 0.1984 0.0442 −0.1853 −0.1174 −0.0886 0.0715 −0.4302 1.000
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Table 5.2: Late, Curtailment, and Prepayment Multinomial Logit Estimates
$100 Minimum $1,000 Minimum
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
neg_eq 0.3191 −0.4628 −1.0500 0.3326 −0.8518 −1.0342
25.7979 −20.7940 −45.8078 26.8959 −17.7728 −45.1896
neg_eq savings premium 0.1616 0.0561 0.2142 0.1545 0.2151 0.2054
56.6626 10.5121 40.3583 54.2679 18.7095 38.7957
pos_eq savings premium 0.1482 0.0092 0.2920 0.1420 0.1160 0.2837
66.2065 2.5457 116.2488 63.6208 16.3028 113.6475
LTV_origination 0.0161 −0.0032 −0.0013 0.0162 −0.0066 −0.0011
70.7840 −8.5220 −9.0222 71.5308 −9.5794 −7.4893
arm 0.3371 0.1462 0.4314 0.3313 0.5083 0.4241
53.8720 11.5977 82.9419 52.9618 20.9231 82.2001
term_30 0.1316 −0.2210 0.0482 0.1401 −0.6307 0.0572
7.0075 −9.0427 4.5294 7.4574 −14.9945 5.4384
co −0.0084 0.0041 0.0004 −0.0085 0.0066 0.0003
−197.3644 45.8155 11.5260 −200.2674 37.0783 8.0266
risk premium −0.0019 0.2544 0.0873 −0.0182 0.2598 0.0683
−1.1037 92.9931 51.6478 −10.8541 51.9495 41.1729
jumbo −0.2965 0.2594 0.0451 −0.2972 1.0552 0.0469
−36.5108 21.1403 8.4374 −36.7160 51.8114 8.9040
prepay_penalty 0.0547 0.0974 −0.6072 0.0475 0.2513 −0.6181
10.2906 9.6178 −124.9288 8.9510 12.6060 −127.6516
documentation_low 0.1444 −0.0805 −0.1885 0.1479 −0.0444 −0.1839
24.9183 −7.2871 −36.6477 25.5470 −2.1628 −36.2699
documentation_unknown −0.4143 −0.2432 1.2965 −0.4058 −0.2196 1.3090
−49.1349 −14.1921 215.2107 −47.9764 −6.2290 219.0656
Atlanta 0.3071 −0.1842 0.3178 0.3125 −0.0816 0.3241
18.4431 −4.8650 21.6995 18.7294 −0.9437 22.2411
Boston 0.4481 0.1004 0.8083 0.4487 0.4103 0.8075
24.2692 2.6543 55.8253 24.2993 5.2646 56.2671
Charlotte 0.1585 −0.3433 0.3213 0.1638 −0.5496 0.3280
6.0865 −5.7891 14.9027 6.2627 −4.0279 15.2479
Chicago 0.2346 0.0142 0.6944 0.2342 0.0915 0.6899
15.3905 0.4064 54.1105 15.3368 1.1862 54.0367
Cleveland 0.1877 0.1866 0.1843 0.1834 0.1266 0.1778
8.4313 3.7238 8.6041 8.2331 1.0004 8.3624
Denver 0.2199 −0.1150 0.4407 0.2278 −0.1605 0.4493
11.2772 −2.8811 27.1379 11.6674 −1.7188 27.8896
127
Table 5.2 continued
$100 Minimum $1,000 Minimum
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
Detroit 0.2732 0.1253 0.3366 0.2700 0.0320 0.3318
16.7323 3.2745 22.0202 16.5159 0.3683 21.8334
Las Vegas 0.1423 −0.0945 0.7173 0.1491 −0.0499 0.7230
7.8513 −2.2642 44.8622 8.2200 −0.5534 45.4986
Los Angeles 0.1691 0.1038 0.9511 0.1723 0.4707 0.9528
12.1179 3.5510 80.2362 12.3298 7.3476 80.8542
Miami 0.2950 0.0784 0.6830 0.2947 0.2796 0.6797
15.2746 1.8397 38.9895 15.2460 3.0168 38.9775
Minneapolis 0.2902 −0.0502 0.6350 0.2928 −0.0962 0.6362
16.1048 −1.2961 41.2411 16.2394 −1.1132 41.6438
New York 0.3479 0.2000 0.6540 0.3459 0.7072 0.6491
25.5191 6.8794 56.1105 25.3270 11.1126 55.9991
Phoenix 0.1039 −0.1381 0.7988 0.1093 −0.2080 0.8030
6.4682 −3.7636 58.3829 6.7927 −2.5079 58.9524
Portland −0.0254 −0.1151 0.7346 −0.0180 −0.2114 0.7416
−1.1747 −2.6342 45.6509 −0.8318 −2.1645 46.3622
San Diego 0.1150 0.0946 0.8214 0.1178 0.4428 0.8230
6.4490 2.7288 57.6989 6.6111 6.1185 58.2902
San Francisco 0.0958 0.0836 0.9281 0.0981 0.4498 0.9298
5.8146 2.6484 71.9246 5.9562 6.7351 72.6523
Seattle −0.0589 −0.0249 0.8118 −0.0540 0.1169 0.8161
−3.2336 −0.6881 57.3464 −2.9614 1.5039 58.0610
Tampa 0.1499 0.0147 0.6211 0.1503 0.0874 0.6196
8.4529 0.3697 39.6290 8.4587 0.9561 39.7328
Washington D.C. 0.1272 0.1292 0.9093 0.1261 0.4662 0.9055
7.9787 3.9545 70.1652 7.9063 6.7320 70.3288
Bank of America −2.0742 1.5746 −1.2582 −2.1135 1.0889 −1.3035
−207.3206 50.5679 −159.8948 −211.0112 19.2202 −165.6796
Residential Funding Corp. −1.8634 1.5581 −1.5595 −1.9011 0.9664 −1.6062
−181.9885 46.5901 −193.5711 −185.4186 14.9690 −199.3818
Wells Fargo −1.9143 1.7426 −1.6696 −1.9680 1.3353 −1.7344
−188.8196 60.3717 −192.8570 −194.1806 26.0610 −201.7064
Aurora Loan Services −1.9728 2.0909 −1.2952 −2.0869 1.3398 −1.4220
−78.3386 59.1100 −105.5007 −83.1467 21.3220 −124.7107
Washington Mutual −1.7211 2.0852 −1.5282 −1.8075 1.5484 −1.6388
−138.4318 69.1103 −131.1909 −145.9099 28.9652 −142.7432
IndyMac −1.4101 1.8236 −2.3410 −1.4630 1.4885 −2.3984
−108.7012 50.0518 −180.0649 −112.9708 22.9921 −185.7240
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Table 5.2 continued
$100 Minimum $1,000 Minimum
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
Chase Manhattan Bank −1.9128 1.5751 −1.7741 −1.9521 1.0331 −1.8174
−151.1835 40.5486 −129.1677 −154.1895 14.3430 −132.6852
EMC Mortgage Corp −1.6635 1.7062 −1.5048 −1.7289 0.9786 −1.5839
−108.2580 51.9095 −121.5813 −112.9139 15.7568 −128.7640
Ocwen −1.6219 1.3165 −1.7642 −1.6549 0.5797 −1.8041
−122.3443 29.9779 −116.6599 −124.7039 6.4047 −119.5170
American Mortgage Corp −1.9954 1.5092 −2.3210 −2.0319 1.2241 −2.3595
−146.3125 42.2674 −133.6175 −148.9118 18.5696 −136.5088
Litton Loan Servicing −2.5384 0.9105 −1.1777 −2.5719 −0.0654 −1.2216
−118.3439 13.9846 −109.2189 −119.7003 −0.3910 −113.1569
GMAC −1.7596 1.2031 −1.0135 −1.7898 0.8007 −1.0528
−105.9562 18.8999 −91.5134 −107.7561 6.9458 −95.3424
Saxon Mortgage Services −1.2544 1.1955 −2.0163 −1.2878 0.6863 −2.0616
−61.1645 18.3835 −106.2681 −62.6022 4.8939 −108.5880
Wilshire Credit Corp −1.7160 1.7624 −1.7411 −1.7718 1.4863 −1.8012
−73.5004 44.6773 −96.6976 −76.0644 21.4918 −101.1952
Option One −1.8991 1.4427 −1.3961 −1.9318 0.9344 −1.4370
−111.9614 26.9815 −107.1624 −113.9134 7.7713 −110.8160
HomeEq Servicing Corp −1.2898 1.2488 −3.2633 −1.3249 0.9504 −3.3075
−32.3225 8.6411 −60.0682 −33.0572 2.9737 −60.9665
PHH Mortgage −1.4402 1.0540 −3.1435 −1.4712 −0.0563 −3.1849
−72.5890 13.9669 −98.8024 −74.1098 −0.3760 −100.3249
LaSalle Bank 0.5039 1.2218 1.3908 0.4786 0.7664 1.3602
13.4731 9.1711 44.0843 12.8619 2.2797 43.5831
All other small servicers −1.6701 1.6412 −1.3317 −1.7126 1.2566 −1.3813
−166.7064 54.1508 −159.6983 −170.9393 23.2745 −166.2615
Vintage 2000 and earlier 1.3673 −0.2069 0.1235 1.3601 0.0381 0.1117
31.5537 −0.8893 2.8861 31.3120 0.0695 2.6029
Vintage 2001 0.7861 0.2583 0.1812 0.7746 0.4007 0.1711
27.8513 2.7477 9.2584 27.3673 2.7964 8.7599
Vintage 2002 0.5447 0.2667 0.3103 0.5384 0.3776 0.3040
30.1337 6.5993 29.7669 29.8013 5.3789 29.5040
Vintage 2003 0.1766 −0.0099 0.1688 0.1794 0.1039 0.1741
15.6500 −0.5007 28.0738 15.9178 2.8179 29.3368
Vintage 2005 −0.0135 −0.0302 −0.0432 −0.0089 −0.0001 −0.0378
−1.5880 −2.2389 −8.4910 −1.0460 −0.0030 −7.5567
Vintage 2006 0.0423 −0.0576 −0.4240 0.0486 0.0803 −0.4111
4.6348 −3.6685 −59.0539 5.3376 2.6673 −57.8224
129
Table 5.2 continued
$100 Minimum $1,000 Minimum
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
Vintage 2007 −0.0629 0.1424 −0.7417 −0.0603 0.4544 −0.7325
−5.5334 6.7395 −62.1395 −5.3178 12.2207 −61.7341
Obs. year 2002 and earlier 0.5225 −24.2016 −0.0042 0.5705 −21.5965 0.0603
20.6902 −363.1883 −0.1453 22.4972 −194.3614 2.0652
Obs. year 2003 0.1915 −6.7637 −0.1423 0.2407 −21.5725 −0.0756
10.2877 −24.5896 −7.2297 12.9133 −412.8135 −3.8510
Obs. year 2004 −0.0252 −3.2499 −0.0164 0.0214 −3.7948 0.0453
−1.6741 −116.0028 −1.0041 1.4225 −52.5498 2.7872
Obs. year 2005 0.1653 −1.9581 0.9513 0.2024 −1.9430 0.9964
11.5691 −97.3070 59.2511 14.1957 −44.3211 62.3696
Obs. year 2006 0.3691 −0.5963 1.6933 0.3783 −0.2483 1.7035
26.3931 −33.9424 105.0308 27.1346 −6.8745 106.1784
Obs. year 2007 0.6073 −0.5418 1.8962 0.6161 −0.1413 1.9043
46.9913 −34.3368 122.1541 47.8159 −4.3636 123.1789
Obs. year 2008 0.7838 −0.3049 1.0724 0.7909 −0.1306 1.0761
70.9791 −26.9276 72.5120 71.7917 −5.5486 72.9764
Obs. year 2009 0.3281 −0.0991 0.5573 0.3290 −0.1387 0.5565
33.7665 −11.1819 38.6425 33.8845 −7.4225 38.6668
Obs. year 2010 −0.0041 −0.0270 0.0018 −0.0055 −0.0782 −0.0001
−0.4773 −4.2503 0.1179 −0.6353 −5.7362 −0.0090
Obs. month January −0.0413 −0.1199 −0.1524 −0.0387 −0.0663 −0.1478
−12.6119 −31.7905 −18.0993 −11.8154 −7.3490 −17.5687
Obs. month February −0.1897 −0.1484 −0.1990 −0.1850 −0.1158 −0.1931
−51.3851 −39.3932 −23.6279 −50.1492 −12.9049 −22.9414
Obs. month March −0.1753 −0.1206 −0.2213 −0.1716 −0.1226 −0.2163
−45.5449 −32.7297 −26.0617 −44.6026 −13.5765 −25.4835
Obs. month April −0.3047 −0.0593 −0.0245 −0.3036 −0.0417 −0.0225
−75.4927 −15.8292 −3.0003 −75.2495 −4.5979 −2.7577
Obs. month May −0.2604 −0.1010 −0.0410 −0.2581 −0.0813 −0.0376
−65.0295 −26.5057 −4.9955 −64.4759 −8.8451 −4.5831
Obs. month June −0.1972 −0.1347 0.0541 −0.1936 −0.0878 0.0580
−49.1080 −33.6425 6.6740 −48.2183 −9.4781 7.1569
Obs. month July −0.1335 −0.1293 0.1501 −0.1297 −0.0826 0.1540
−33.5719 −32.8557 18.7206 −32.6253 −9.0280 19.2001
Obs. month August −0.1218 −0.1057 0.0381 −0.1185 −0.0486 0.0416
−31.4563 −28.5990 4.6616 −30.6193 −5.4644 5.0885
Obs. month September −0.0995 −0.0549 0.0408 −0.0988 −0.0113 0.0415
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Table 5.2 continued
$100 Minimum $1,000 Minimum
Variables Late Curtail Prepay Late Curtail Prepay
−26.7530 −15.8408 4.9943 −26.5815 −1.2959 5.0861
Obs. month October −0.0021 −0.0572 −0.0306 −0.0022 −0.0278 −0.0311
−0.6078 −16.6548 −3.6573 −0.6279 −3.2272 −3.7117
Obs. month November −0.0563 −0.0198 0.0342 −0.0557 −0.0017 0.0348
−19.1040 −6.8664 4.1929 −18.9236 −0.2287 4.2676
constant 2.0710 −6.2123 −5.4977 2.1077 −10.1327 −5.4522
47.6154 −71.4391 −147.6197 48.4804 −58.7720 −147.2812
N observations 18,476,303 18,476,303
N curtailment 1,323,825 257,298
N loans 815,827 815,827
Pseudo-R2 0.1511 0.1651
This table presents the multinomial logistic results for the minimum curtailment amounts of $100 and $1,000
with the competing choices of delinquency, current payment, curtailment, or full prepayment. The base case
for both regressions is current payment status. Coecients reported with t-statistics below. Standard errors
reported are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered on the loan identier level.
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